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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, technological developments have brought about a revolution in
communication and business practices, centering on the use of personal computers
connected through a web of networks commonly known as the "Internet." This
revolution has led to increased efficiency for businesses and consumers seeking to
purchase or sell goods, services, or intangibles. However, the increased use of
personal computers in commerce faces barriers based on legal concepts that were
developed at a time when the technology could not even have been imagined.
The principal perceived legal barrier to the development of electronic
commerce on the Internet is the Statute of Frauds.! First enacted in England more
than three hundred years ago, this much-maligned,2 yet durable, statute was
subsequently enacted, in substantially unchanged form, in every state. The Statute
of Frauds conditions the enforceability of certain types of promises on the formal
requirements of a "writing" that is "signed" by the person against whom the promise
is sought to be enforced. Because much electronic commerce is predicated on the
exchange of electronic messages, without the production of a paper record of the
messages, a requirement of a "signed writing" evidencing the transaction is widely
believed to discourage the use of these efficient technologies. Accordingly, many
commentators have called for the repeal or substantial abolition of the Statute of
Frauds as it relates to electronic commerce transactions3 or for amendment of the
Statute of Frauds to validate these transactions.4 Indeed, forty-three states have
either enacted or are considering legislation affecting the Statute of Frauds as it
relates to electronic commercial transactions.'

1. Practical impediments exist as well, including the attitudinal reluctance to use computers in
commercial transactions. This attitude results, in part, from highly publicized incursions of computer
networks for fraudulent or malicious reasons. Some notable examples are listed in WARWICK FORD &
MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONiC COMMERCE § 1.1, at 3-5 (1997). Another impediment is the
absence of a secure method of payment for items purchased on the Internet. However, recent
developments indicate that this latter barrier may soon disappear. VISA and MasterCard are jointly
experimenting with a venture known as the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol which
involves the encrypted transmission and confirmation of credit card numbers in such a way that the
merchant can verify the validity of the credit card without knowing the credit card number. For a brief
description of the SET protocol, see id. § 7.8, at 303-06.
2. See, e.g., Francis M. Burdick,A Statutefor PromotingFraud,16 CoLuM.L.REv. 273,273-74
(1916); E. Rabel, The Statute of Fraudsand ComparativeLegal History, 63 L.Q. REV. 174, 186-87
(1947); James Fitzjames Stephen & Frederick Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute ofFrauds,1
L.Q. REv. 1, 5-8 (1885); Hugh Evander Willis, The Statute ofFrauds-A LegalAnachronism(pts. 1
& 2), 3 IND. L.J. 427, 528 (1928).
3. E.g., Marc E. Szafran, Note, A Neo-Institutional Paradigmfor Contracts Formed in
Cyberspace: JudgmentDayfor the Statute of Frauds,14 CARDOzo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 491, 508 n.73
(1996).
4. E.g., Deborah L. Wilkerson, Comment, ElectronicCommerce Underthe U.C.C. Section 2-201
Statute of Frauds:Are ElectronicMessages Enforceable?,41 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 426-27 (1992).
5. A current list of state statutes, both enacted and proposed, can be found at the web site of the
Chicago law firm of McBride, Baker & Coles. Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital
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In discussing the issues raised by electronic commerce on the Internet and the
Statute of Frauds, this Article first defines some key terms that will be used in this

Article and then discusses the benefits and hazards of various forms of electronic
commerce. Next, this Article examines three legislative alternatives to
accommodate the needs of electronic commerce and the Statute of Frauds: (1) do
nothing and allow the judiciary to determine whether electronic commerce
transactions satisfy the existing requirements ofthe Statute of Frauds; (2) repeal the
Statute ofFrauds, either altogether or as to electronic commerce transactions; or (3)
amend the Statute of Frauds to validate all, or some, forms of electronic commerce
transactions. This Article concludes that only the third of these alternatives is
practicable and then reviews and evaluates a number of legislative initiatives
amending the Statute of Frauds to accommodate electronic commerce.
II. TERMINOLOGY
This Article employs a number of terms to describe various forms of electronic
transactions. For purposes of this Article, an "electronic commerce" transaction is
one that is consummated by two or more persons (or by two or more computers
programmed by persons) who exchange messages regarding an agreement through
an electronic messaging system, and who have no expectation that a paper record
of the transaction will be generated or retained by either party. Hence, the term
"electronic commerce" does not include messaging systems like telegraph, telex,
or facsimile machines, all of which also involve electronic transmission of
messages, because these technologies ordinarily produce a message on paper.6
Likewise, it does not include documents created by one person, such as wills or
trusts, even though such documents may have legal consequences. Finally, it does
not cover the electronic filing of information with a government entity as required
or allowed by law.
As defined, electronic commerce has two distinct subsets. The first is Electronic
Data Interchange (EDI). "EDI is the movement of electronic business messages,
such as purchase orders, from computer to computer."7 EDI is distinguished from
other forms of electronic messaging because its messages are structured and coded
in accordance with a standard previously agreed upon by sender and recipient.8 The

SignatureLegislation (last modified Mar. 10, 1998) <http://www.mbc.com/ds__sum.html>.
6. The foregoing is not entirely accurate, given the recent development of fax modems that
transmit data which emulate a fax but store such data on a computer disk, and the increasing use of
computers as telex terminals. BENJAMINWRIGHTTHELAWOFELECTRONIC COMMERCE §§ 1.1.1, 1.1.3
(2d ed. 1996). However, because the majority of fax and telex transmissions produce a paper record,
they do not pose the problems presented by pure, paper-free "electronic commerce" and will not be
included in that term.
7. Id. § 1.1.4, at 1:8; see also FORD &BAUM, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 27 (defining EDI as "the

computer-to-computer exchange of business transactions, such as purchase orders, invoices, and
payment advices within large industrial communities or government.").
8. WRIGHT,supranote 6, § 1.1.4, at 1:8.
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standard is a language that adheres to a prescribed syntax so that each item of data
is transmitted in a prescribed order and is surrounded by a computer-generated code
that operates to delineate the different items of data.9 EDI transactions are designed
to allow a receiving computer to automatically transfer the data into other
application programs, making it unnecessary for a human to receive the message
and then manually key the data into another application program.'0 EDI transactions
are limited to transactions between businesses and require some prior agreement
between the parties in order to establish which of the available standards the EDI
"trading partners" will use." EDI transactions generally are conducted over valueadded networks' and historically have not used Internet protocols." Although EDI
transactions will be briefly discussed in this article, they do not pose many of the
problems posed by less structured electronic commerce transactions conducted over
the Internet.
Electronic commerce not involving EDI can be called "open electronic
commerce," which is "characterized by Internet-based, ubiquitous commerce
without pre-negotiated, customized, bilateral agreements" between participants. 4
Open electronic commerce transactions take one of two forms: The first is
electronic mail (e-mail), the transfer of messages from one computer to another,
usually in alphanumeric character messages intended for human reading; 5 the
second is many-to-many communication, which "makes a mass of information
available to remote computer users in a real-time, interactive mode." 16 The primary
example of many-to-many communication is the World Wide Web, a network of
interconnected computers on the Internet. 7 Electronic commerce on the World
Wide Web is a relatively recent development. Unlike EDI, which is used
exclusively by businesses, open electronic commerce, either by e-mail or on the
World Wide Web, is capable of being used by both business persons and consumers
who desire to sell and buy items.
Open electronic commerce transactions on the World Wide Web may, in turn,

9. Id.; see also Douglas Robert Morrisson, Comment, The Statute of Frauds Online: Can a
Computer Sign a Contractfor the Sale of Goods?, 14 GEo. MASON L. REv. 637, 641 (1992) (stating

that "EDI tightly controls the sequence in which the data appear" to preserve the integrity of the data).
10. WRIGHT, supranote 6,§ 1.1.4, at 1:8.
11. See FoRD &BAUM, supranote 1, § 2.4, at 29.
12. These networks generally provide "data communications services and, in addition, assist their
clients in such areas as software configuration, security, auditing, transaction tracing, and recovery of
lost data," FoRD &BAUM, supranote 1, § 2.4, at 27.
13.Id.
14. Id. at 29. Of course, it is possible for two entities to agree to conduct business with each other
over the Internet in a non-EDI format. See infra text accompanying note 19.
15. WRIGHT, supranote 6,§ 1.1.2, at 1:6.
16.1d. § 1.1.6, at 1:10.

"The Internet is an international network of computers and computer networks connected
17. Id.
to each other through routers using the TCP/IP protocols and sharing a common name and address
space."

HENRY H. PERRIrr,JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
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take different forms."8 One form would be repeated transactions between one seller
and one buyer. For example, a buyer and seller might agree to conduct future
transactions with each other over the Internet in a non-EDI format. In these
circumstances, the parties would likely enter into an agreement similar to that used
by EDI trading partners and will likely provide for the use of security procedures
that will allow them to identify each other's messages in a reliable way.
A closely related form would be repeated transactions between one seller and
anumber ofbuyers. For example, amail-order catalog business might operate aweb
site that could be used by its customers to purchase items. In such a case, the seller
and each of its buyers would likely agree that the buyer would use some form of
security procedure (such as a PIN number) in order to identify the buyer to the
seller's computer when placing an order."
Finally, there is at least the prospect of what can be called stranger-to-stranger
transactions on the Internet. In these instances, typically neither the buyer nor the
seller will have had prior dealings with each other and, in many cases, the only
dealing they ever will have is the sale of a single item in an isolated transaction.
This situation poses the greatest risk of fraud and misunderstanding.
The term "Statute of Frauds" is misleading because it suggests that there is a
single statute defining all the promises that must be evidenced by a signed writing
in order to be enforceable; in fact, every state has numerous statutes requiring
various types of agreements to take such form. The traditional Statute of Frauds is
modeled after the English statute of 1677 and ordinarily requires a memorandum
signed by the party against whom an action is brought to enforce specified
categories of promises.2" However, the most commercially significant writing
requirement for contracts is section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.). This provision requires some "writing '2 ' "signed" by the person against
whom enforcement is sought in order for a contract for the sale of goods at a price
of $500 or more to be enforceable.' Furthermore, in virtually all states there are
different statutes that require other types of promises to be in some written or signed

18. For a description of various forms of open electronic commerce, and a helpful taxonomy of
possible authentication procedures that would be used in these forms, see Jane Kaufman Winn, Open
Systems, Free Markets and Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 TuL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
This article is available online at <http://www.smu.edu/-jwinn/esig.htm>.
19. Professor Winn describes a system involving both ofthese forms of open electronic commerce
as a "closed-bilateral" one. Id.

20. A typical Statute of Frauds in the United States includes contracts for the sale of an interest
in real property; contracts that cannot be performed within one year of the date of their making;
contracts whereby one person agrees to answer for the debts of another; and other miscellaneous
promises such as marriage promises andbrokerage agreements. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624 (West
Supp. 1998); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
21.'"[]riting' includes printing, typewriting orany other intentional reductionto tangible form."

U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1995).
22. "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to
authenticate a writing." U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1995).
23. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1995).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss4/6
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form to be enforceable.24
Although there are substantial differences between the various forms of these
statutes and their requirements, for purposes of this article, the term Statute of
Frauds refers, collectively, to all state statutes requiring some writing or note or
memorandum that is signed by or bears the signature of some person as a
requirement for the enforceability of a promise or set of promises.' To avoid
redundancy, this article will use the words "writing" and "signed" to encompass all
similarly-phrased requirements.
III. THE BENEFITS AND PITFALLS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
A. The Benefits of Electronic Commerce
EDI and open electronic commerce transactions produce similar benefits for
both suppliers and purchasers of items sold in electronic commerce transactions.
Both forms of communication cut costs by eliminating inefficient paper shuffling
and storage.26 Both allow commercial entities to react more swiftly to changing

conditions by altering pricing to reflect supply and demand in real-time.27 Both
allow essentially instantaneous responses to needs of the other party.
However, EDI, as the more structured and older technology, has some benefits
not yet translatable into open electronic commerce transactions. For example, EDI
utilizes a prescribed syntax based on public EDI standards. Accordingly, the
receiving computer can automatically transfer the structured and coded data "into
' This
diverse application programs such as inventory management software."28
reduces the possibility of data-entry errors by a human recipient and expedites the
process offulfilling orders, shipping products, and accounting.29 Likewise, EDI cuts
costs by eliminating "redundant keying of information into computers."3' It also

24. For example, the Illinois General Assembly has enacted statutes requiring the following types
of contracts, inter alia, to be evidenced by some writing: contracts with a credit services organization,
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/7 (West 1993); contracts for dance studio services, 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 610/4 (West 1993); contracts for the payment of royalties from music, 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 637/15 (West Supp. 1997); and contracts for physical fitness services, 815 ILL. COMp.
STAT. ANN. 645/4 (West 1993).
25. Outside the U.C.C., the terms "memorandum" or"note" are frequently used instead ofwriting
and the term "subscribed" is occasionally used instead of signed. Ordinarily, none of these terms are
defined in the Statute of Frauds itself and must be interpreted by courts as individual disputes arise.
Although some courts have found significant differences between a requirement that the contract be
either in writing or evidenced by a note or memorandum, they are unimportant for purposes of this
article. See generally 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTs § 567A, at 12-13 (3d ed. 1961).
26. WRIGHT, supranote 6, § 2.4, at 2:7.
27. Id.
28. Id.§ 1.1.4, at 1:8.
29. Id.
30.Id. § 2.4, at 2:7.
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helps businesses cut lead times and reduce inventories.3' As a result, orders are
more frequent, smaller in quantity, and less valuable, reducing the incentive to
dispute a particular transaction.32 "Because the standards cover a relatively
inflexible set of transaction sets, EDI communications are much less likely to be
ambiguous than free text transmissions" used in open electronic commerce
transactions33 which substantially reduces the likelihood of misunderstanding
between EDI trading partners.
On the other hand, open electronic commerce has a number of advantages not
present in EDI. EDI transactions are conducted between trading partners who have
a history of prior transactions. Furthermore, the structure of EDI standards is such
that it cannot be used as a form of advertising to reach new customers. However,
the openness and lack of structure on the Internet, particularly the World Wide
Web, allow interested buyers to surf the Web looking for sellers of an item, and
sellers can advertise their products and services for sale to these potential buyers.34
After finding a suitable product,the buyer can place an order, make payment and
shipping arrangements, and receive some confirmation of the order, all without
speaking to another human being or producing any paper record of the transaction.
This openness allows sellers to create, and buyers to access, a market that is literally
world-wide.
B. The Pi#falls ofElectronic Commerce
EDI transactions have very few pitfalls. There is, of course, the possibility of
data-entry errors or programming glitches at the sending computer, but these are no
different than the chances of error in paper-based transactions. 35 The structure and
codes that permeate EDI transactions, as well as the fact that these transactions are
often conducted over secure networks, reduce the likelihood of malicious thirdparty intervention. EDI safeguards are very sophisticated, but for purposes of this
article, need not be detailed.36
In order to understand some of the problems posed by open electronic
commerce transactions other than e-mail, it is necessary to understand that these

31. Id. "EDI is the lifeblood of the just-in-time campaign in manufacturing and the 'Quick
Response' techniques in retailing." Id.
32. WRIGHT, supranote 6, § 2.4, at 2:7.
33. YOCHAIBENKLER, RULES OF THEROADFORTHEINFORMA'ION SUPERHIGHWAY: ELECTRONIC

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW § 1.213], at 13 (1996).
34. FORD & BAUM, supranote 1, § 2.2, at 21.
35. A number of cases have reached different results concerning the legal effect of offers sent by
telegram where the telegraph company enters a price or amount different from that directed by the
offeror. Compare Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 10 A. 495, 497 (Me. 1887) (offer valid), with
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cowin & Co., 20 F.2d 103, 104 (8th Cir. 1927) (offer invalid).
36. For excellent summaries of the reliability of EDI-transmitted data, see FoRD & BAUM, supra
note 1, § 5.6, at 172-73 (discussing internal EDI security mechanisms); WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 5.3,
at 5:4-5:5 (discussing methods to ensure reliable EDI transmission).
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transactions involve the transmission of information in digital form, rather than
alphanumeric text files. Such information is represented in a binary series ofzeroes
and ones and may include items other than language, such as music and color.37
"The most common manner in which binary files are transferred is called File
Transfer Protocol" (FTP), which "allows the user to send complex files, as well as
to retrieve data from sources, both public and private, that are not or cannot be
presented in free text."3
"Digital representation strips information down to very simple building
blocks-binary electric impulses" representing zeroes and ones.39 This digital
representation is mutable and can be manifested in different ways.4" For example,
digital representation of words can take the form of either text or speech 4 ' As one
writer has observed, "[t]he essence ofatext can no longer be its unique combination
of information and fixed form, for the knowledge that it conveys is mutable-to
speech, sound or visual imagery."42
Because digital representation ofinformation is so basic, human beings do not
have immediate access to information stored and represented digitally. 43 We must
use a mediating device, such as a computer screen, a video projection, an audio
speaker, or a printed page." In this sense, the information actually viewed or heard
is never really original, because it is a representation of information stored in
machine-readable form. On the other hand, the representation is an original in that
45
every copy is an original and no original is not a copy.
The other determining characteristic of digital information is its malleability.
Because digital information comes in simple, building-block form, 46 users can
receive the information and interact with it. Users "can transform its representation,
they can add and subtract, cut and paste, copy and multiply, becoming producers as
well as consumers of the message."4' 7 Unlike tangible items, such as paper, it is
impossible to tell a copy of digital information from the original, and it is
functionally impossible to tell that a digital message has been tampered with by
someone other than the original sender.48
In addition to the inherent problems of storing and transmitting information in
digital form, open electronic commerce transactions (including e-mail) lack the
structure and coding associated with EDI transactions and are thus more likely to

37. BENKLER, supranote 33,

§ 1.2[2], at 11.

38.Id.
39. Id. § 2.1[1][a], at23.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. B NKLER,supranote 33, § 2.1[1], at 24.
44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id. § 2.1[1][b], at 25.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 2.3[1], at 31-32.
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give rise to ambiguity and misunderstanding. These transactions are conducted over
open, insecure networks and it is impracticable to attempt to limit access to these
networks. Because messages on the Internet are not sent over a single pathway, but
are transmitted over a series of thousands of networks, a message must, necessarily,
move from packet-switching node to node49 on the Internet before reaching its final
destination. The result is that any person with access to any intermediate node, can
intercept, read, or alter an electronic message in a way that is undetectable by the
recipient.5"
Likewise, a person who receives an electronic message over the Internet will
have great difficulty in reliably identifying the source of the message. "[I]t is
relatively easy to 'spoof a network into sending a communication with a 'return
address' of someone other than the actual sender."'" This possibility is complicated
because open electronic commerce "contemplates one-time exchanges between
parties who may have never dealt with each other before"52 and have no meaningful
way of establishing one's bonafides without an investigation that would be more
expensive to undertake than the value of the transaction at issue. Finally, a
computerized record of an open electronic commerce transaction can be easily and
undetectably altered once it is stored in the recipient's computer.53
C. Electronic Commerce and Legal Rules Premised on Paper-Based
Commerce
For all the foregoing reasons, the transmission of information over open
networks and the storage of information in digital form is inherently less secure than
transmitting and storing information on paper. Signed paper documents have a
number of inherent security attributes, such as the semipermanence of ink
embedded in paper, unique attributes of some printing processes, watermarks, the
distinctiveness of individual signatures, and the limited ability to erase, interlineate
or otherwise modify words on paperO4 For years individuals and businesses have
relied on these inherent security attributes to make a signed paper document a

reliable basis for conducting business.
Although open electronic commerce transactions pose security risks to the
participants not present in transactions utilizing signed paper documents, the
advantages of open electronic commerce greatly outweigh those risks. However, the
0

49. Information on the Internet is transmitted in a string of data bits, known as a "packet." These
packets are transferred according to layers of protocols that operate independently of each other. For
an explanation of these different layers of protocols, see FORD & BAUM, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 15-17.
50. GARRY S.HOWARD, INTRODUCTIONTOINTERNETSECuRrrY 207 (1995); Lorijean G. Oei, The
Legal Role of Information Security, in ONLINE LAW: THE SPA'S LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS
ON THE INTERNET 27, 32-33 (Thomas J. Smedinghoffed., 1996).
51. Oei, supranote 50, at 32; see also HOWARD, supranote 50, at 207.
52. Oei, supranote 50, at 33.
53. Id.
54. FoRD & BAUM, supranote 1, § 1.2, at 6.
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Statute of Frauds presents a fundamental legal barrier to the expansion of electronic
commerce. Notwithstanding the undoubted advantages of doing business
electronically, even if the security risks can be minimized, many business persons
remain unwilling to conduct business electronically so long as there is substantial
doubt concerning the legal validity of agreements entered into electronically."5
Hence, some accommodation between electronic commerce and the Statute of
Frauds must be reached.

IV. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ACCOMMODATING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

State legislatures have three possible courses of action with respect to the
Statute of Frauds and electronic commerce transactions: (1) do nothing, and allow
the courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether electronic commerce
agreements satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds; (2) repeal the Statute
of Frauds, either altogether or with respect to electronic commerce transactions; or

(3) amend the Statute of Frauds to validate all, or some, forms of electronic
commerce transactions.
A. Allow the Courtsto Determine Whether ElectronicCommerceAgreements
Satisfy the Statute of Frauds
Although computers are revolutionizing communications and commerce, it
must be remembered that this is not the first revolution in communication since the
advent of the Statute of Frauds. Over the years, courts have had to apply the
provisions of the Statute of Frauds to a number of technological innovations that at
the time must have seemed just as revolutionary as computers seem today. For more
than 150 years, courts have interpreted the Statute of Frauds in a way that
accommodated these innovations without legislative amendment. A legislature,
therefore, could rationally decide that the courts alone are perfectly competent to
determine the relationship between the Statute of Frauds and electronic commerce.
It should be remembered that, other than the U.C.C., the Statute of Frauds does
not define what is meant by a "writing" or a "signing." 6 Hence, courts have
frequently had occasion to interpret these terms in many earlier cases. Reviewing
how courts have interpreted the Statute's requirements of a signed writing with
respect to past innovations may assist in predicting how courts will interpret the
Statute of Frauds with respect to electronic commerce.

55. E.g., Geanne Rosenberg, Legal Uncertainty Clouds Status of Contracts on Internet, N.Y.
TiMEs, July 7, 1997, atD3.
56. 4 WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 567, at 5.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1998

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLiNA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:787

1. The Telegraph
In 1844, Samuel F. B. Morse sent the telegraphic message "What hath God
wrought,""7 thereby inaugurating a revolution in communications. It did not take
long for the question of the legal effect of telegraphic messages to find its way into
American courts. In Durkee v. Vermont CentralRailroadCo. 8 an agent brought an
action to recover a commission for his services pursuant to authorization sent by
telegraph. The court viewed the matter as turning on what constituted appropriate
proof that the telegraph contained the contractual authority. The court stated that
telegraphic communications were to be treated like other writings, noting that the
telegram had to be in written form at each end of the line and that it was appropriate
to enter into evidence the original version of the message transmitted, or a copy
thereof.5 9
A few years later, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided Howley v.
Whipple,' in which the court determined whether a telegraphed message complied
with the Statute of Frauds. The court, in colorful and oft-cited language, held:
[I]t makes no difference whether [the telegraph] operator writes the offer
or the acceptance in the presence of his principal and by his express
direction, with a steel pen an inch long attached to an ordinary penholder,
or whether his pen be a copper wire a thousand miles long. In either case
the thought is communicated to the paper by the use of the finger resting
upon the pen; nor does it make any difference that in one case common
record ink is used, while in the other case a more subtle fluid, known as
electricity, performs the same office.6'
Over the remainder of the nineteenth century, courts almost routinely held that
telegrams were writings within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. 6'
The harder question with respect to whether a telegram satisfied the Statute of
Frauds is whether it was signed by the sender. Early cases held them to be signed, 6'
but the precedential effect of these cases was limited. During this pre-telephone era,

the sender of a telegram went to the telegraph office, wrote out and signed the
message, gave the written message to the telegraph operator, and the telegraph

57. 8 THENEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 340, 340-41 (15th ed. 1995).
58. 29 Vt. 48 (1856).
59. Id. at 53; see also Trevor v. Wood, 36 N.Y. 307, 310-11 (1867) (telegraph medium plus a
confirmatory letter is a sufficient writing).
60.48 N.H. 487 (1869).
61. Id. at 488.
62. See, e.g., Brewer v. Horst-Lachmund Co., 60 P. 418, 419 (Cal. 1900) (two telegrams read
together constitute a note or memorandum); Smithv. Easton, 54 Md. 138, 146-47 (1880) (telegraphic
dispatch is a writing); Western Twine Co. v. Wright, 78 N.W. 942, 944 (S.D. 1899) (copy of original
telegram is a sufficient writing).
63. E.g., Howley, 48 N.H. at 490.
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company routinely kept the handwritten originals." Hence, there was usually a
paper version of the telegraphed message which the sender had manually signed in
ink.
Even after the invention of the telephone, which allowed a sender to call the
telegraph company and dictate a message to an operator who then transmitted it,
courts eventually held that the telegram was signed. In Selma Savings Bank v.
Webster County Bank" the court reasoned that sending a telegram in this manner
was no different from dictating a message to one's secretary who would sign it and
deliver the written message to the telegraph company for transmission.'
The modem view is illustrated by Yaggy v. B. V.D. Co.' where a seller of real
estate sent atelegraphic acceptance of a buyer's offer and later failed to perform the
contract. When sued by the buyer, the seller denied the existence of a contract,
using the Statute of Frauds as a defense.68 The court noted that printed letters had
been held to satisfy the Statute of Frauds; therefore, the typewritten name of the
seller at the end of the telegram was a sufficient signing so long as the seller
directed the affixing of it with the intent to identify the telegram.69
Nevertheless, occasional decisions have cast doubt on whether a telegram can
constitute a signed writing. For example, in Pike Industries v. Middlebury
Associates" the court held that a telegraph message containing an indemnity
agreement was not signed and thus did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The court
stated:
In this case there has been introduced no such signed document. The
telegram contains no actual signature. The evidence does not disclose
whether it was dispatched by telephone, or by submission of a written text.
If the latter, no signed version has been introduced, if one exists, nor any
signed authority of the sending agent. Therefore the Statute of Frauds bars
use of the telegram as written evidence of an indemnity contract, and we
so hold."

64. Morrisson, supranote 9, at 647.
65. 206 S.W. 870 (Ky. 1918).
66. Id. at 872.

67. 173 S.E.2d 496 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
68. Id. at 501.
69. Id; accord Hillstrom v. Gosnay, 614 P.2d 466, 469 (Mont. 1980) (typewritten name in
telegram is sufficient so long as it was affixed with intent to authenticate); Hansen v. Hill, 340 N.W.2d
8, 12 (Neb. 1983) (telegraph company acted as an agent of sender for purposes of signing); La Mar
Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Credit & Commodity Corp., 216 N.Y.S.2d 186, 190 (City Ct. 1961) ("any other
view would be unrealistic and would produce pernicious consequences, impeding the conduct of
business transactions"); see also Schneider v. Norris, 105 Eng. Rep. 388 (K.B. 1814) (holding that a
printed name recognized as a signature constitutes a signing).
70. 398 A.2d 280, 282 (Vt. 1979).
71. Id. at 282.
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The court did not cite to any of the multitude of prior cases holding that the sender's
typewritten name appearing on the telegram constituted a sufficient signing.72
Despite such rare and aberrational decisions, by the mid-twentieth century there was
little doubt in most states that a telegram would satisfy both the writing and signing
requirements of the Statute of Frauds.73
2. The Telex or Telecopier
In the twentieth century, the telegram gradually gave way to the telex machine,

which allowed "each user to have direct access to every other user with a"similar
machine,74 without the need of the telegraph company as intermediary. The validity
of agreements formed by telex under the Statute of Frauds was established in
Joseph Denunzio FruitCo. v. Crane,75 where the court stated:
[We] must take a realistic view of modem business practices, and can
probably take judicial notice of the extensive use to which the teletype
machine is being used today among business firms, particularly brokers, in
the expeditious transmission of typewritten messages. No case in point has
been called to the court's attention on this particular point, and a diligent
search of the authorities has failed to uncover the status of teletype
machines as satisfying the California Statute of Frauds. The point appears
to be a res nova, but this court will hold that the teletype messages in this
case satisfied the Statute of Frauds in California.76
Although no subsequent case has contained any extended discussion of the issue,
are consistent with the Denunzio court's holding that a telex is a signed
later cases
77
writing.

72. See infra note 73.
73. See Bartlett-Heard Land & Cattle Co. v. Harris, 238 P. 327, 329 (Ariz. 1925); Heffernan v.
Keith, 127 So. 2d 903,904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Blackburn v. City ofPaducah, 441 S.W.2d 395,
397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); Hillstrom,614 P.2d at 470; Hansen, 340 N.W.2d at 12 ; J.E. Tarbell Co. v.
Grimes, 149 A. 73,75 (N.H. 1930); La Mar,216 N.Y.S.2d at 190; Yaggy v. B.V.D. Co., 173 S.E.2d
496, 501 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970). See generally2 ARTHUR LiNToN CoRBIN, CoRB N oN CoNTrtRACTS
§ 522 (1950) (describing form of signature required); Morrisson, supranote9, at 654 (concluding that
law today requires a fact-based inquiry into the subjective intent of the sender).
74. Richard Allan Homing, Has Hal Signeda Contract: The Statute ofFraudsin Cyberspace,
12 SANTA CLARA COMPrER & HIGHTECH. L.J. 253, 286 (1996).
75. 79 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948), motionfor new trialgranted,89 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Cal.
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1951).
76. Id. at 128-29.
77. See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard Oil & Serv. Co., 760 F.2d 417, 423 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that the telex confirming Apex's obligation to purchase satisfied the written confirmation
exception in U.C.C. § 2-201(2)); Interocean Shipping Co. v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 523
F.2d 527, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that a telex evidencing the guarantee and signed by the agent
of the party to be charged satisfies the Statute of Frauds).
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3.

The Telefacsimile (Fax)Machine

Given the greatly increased use of fax machines in recent years, it is surprising
that there are no reported cases deciding whether a fax transmission constitutes a
sufficient writing for purposes of the Statute of Frauds 78, although one court clearly
assumed that it does. In Bazak InternationalCorp. v. Mast Industries79 the court

held that five telecopied 0 purchase orders constituted confirmations that satisfied
the requirements of section 2-201(2) of the U.C.C.8 The court, however, did not
specifically address the question of whether a fax message was a writing, and the
parties apparently did not raise the issue. 2
A court addressed whether a fax is signed in ParmaTile Mosaic & Marble Co.
v. Estate of Short 3 where a contractor faxed a message to the plaintiff stating that
it would be willing to guarantee payment for goods delivered to a subcontractor.
The fax machine had been programmed to print the contractor's name at the top of
the page, but no manual signature appeared at the bottom of the page." In a
subsequent dispute, the contractor claimed that the Statute of Frauds barred
enforcement of the promise because there was no subscription as required by the
relevant Statute of Frauds." The trial court rejected this contention and, citing
Bazak, held that the signature does not have to be in ink at the bottom of the page,
but could be any symbol whether written or printed, appearing on any part of the
document." The trial court also concluded that the contractor "should not be
permitted to evade its obligation because of the current and extensive use of

78. The effect of a fax transmission has been litigated with respect to questions other than the
Statute of Frauds. For example, in American Multimedia,Inc. v. DaltonPackaginglnc.,540 N.Y.S.2d
410,412 (Sup. Ct. 1989), the court assumed that a faxed purchase ordercontaining an arbitration clause
was a writing for purposes of a federal arbitration statute. In Calabresev. Springer Personnel,534
N.Y.S.2d 83, 83 (Civ. Ct. 1988), the defendant received a faxed copy of an order to answer plaintiff's
interrogatories. When the defendant failed to submit the answers within the time specified by the order,
the plaintiffmoved for sanctions. The issue turned on whether the defendant had been served. The court
ruled that the faxed order clearly satisfied the plain intent of the rule governing service of papers. Id.
at 84.
79. 538 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1989).
80. Id. at 509. Although the court used the term "telecopied," which is usually synonymous with
a telex, the court's description of the documents involved suggests that the method of transmittal was
a fax machine.

81. Id.
82. The court must have assumed, without deciding, that the faxed messages were writings,
because in order for a message to qualify as a "confirmation" itmustbe "sufficient against the sender."
U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1995). To be sufficient against the sender, it must satisfy the requirements of
section 2-201 (1), which includes a "writingsufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties." Id. § 2-201(1) (emphasis added).
83. 590 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff'dmem., 619 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1994), rev'd,
663 N.E.2d 633 (1996).
84. Id. at 1020.

85.Id.
86.Id.
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electronic transmissions in modem business transactions.""
On appeal, however, the New York Court of Appeals reversed. It stated that a
name is not a signature "'unless inserted or adopted with an intent, actual or
apparent, to authenticate a writing."' 88 The court said that no intent to authenticate
resulted merely from the machine-generated name at the top of the page, and that
no such intent could be inferred from the act of programming the fax machine to
print the name: "We also reject plaintiff's contention that the intentional act of
programming a fax machine, by itself, sufficiently demonstrates to the recipient the
89
sender's apparent intention to authenticate every document subsequently faxed."
Although the Court of Appeals held that the particular fax did not satisfy the Statute
of Frauds, nothing in the opinion suggests that a fax is not a writing or that it could
not be signed if it bore some human-generated symbol constituting a signing.
Another recent decision casts more doubt on whether a fax constitutes a signed
writing. In DepartmentofTransportationv. Norris" a Georgia statute required that
a claimant provide written notice to the Department within one year of the date of
injury as a prerequisite to filing suit. Claimant sent a fax transmission to the
Department, which it received within the one-year period, but a subsequent written
notice was received after the expiration of the period. The court held that the fax
transmission was not given in writing and observed:
It may also be added that a facsimile transmission does not satisfy the
statutory requirementthat notice be "given in writing." Such atransmission
is an audio signal via a telephone line containing information from which
a writing may be accurately duplicated, but the transmission of beeps and
chirps along a telephone line is not a writing, as that term is customarily
used. Indeed, the facsimile transmission may be created, transmitted,
received, stored and read without a writing, in the conventional sense, or
hard copy in the technical vernacular, having ever been created.9'
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mailing of the
written notice satisfied the statutory requirement that the notice be presented to or
given within one year even though it was not received until after the expiration of
the one-year period and, thus, the court did not address the sufficiency of the faxed
notice.' However, the dissenting opinion concluded that the facsimile transmission
failed to satisfy the writing requirement of the statute, stating that "[the legislature]

87. Id. at 1021.
88. Parma Tile, 663 N.E.2d at 635 (quoting Mesibov, Glinert & Levy v. Cohen Bros. Mfg. Co.,
157 N.E. 148, 149 (Ct. App. 1927)).

89. Id.
90.474 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996), rev'dsub nom. Norris v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 486
S.E.2d 826 (1997).
91.Id. at 218.
92. Norris,486 S.E.2d at 827, 828 n.1.
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did not see fit to include facsimile transmission as an appropriate method for
presenting written notification."'93 Although Norris did not involve the Statute of
Frauds or the issue of contract formation or validity, the case does indicate that a
court may well determine that the concept of a writing is not broad enough to
include information that is transmitted electronically, even if it is reproduced on
paper by the recipient of the transmission.
4. Tape Recordings
A few cases have addressed the issue of whether an audiotape of a
conversation, during which a contract is formed or acknowledged, satisfies the
Statute of Frauds. A leading case is Ellis CanningCo. v. Bernstein,94 involving a
contract to sell corporate shares. The parties had taped a telephone conversation of
their agreement in anticipation of a later final written agreement. Although the court
held that there were sufficient, subsequent written documents to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds contained in section 8-3 19 of the U.C.C.,95 the court went on to address
whether the tape recorded conversation alone could satisfy the Statute:
But we go a step farther, and we freely concede that the step we take is not
supported by any reported case we have been able to find. We hold that
when the parties agreed to the tape recording of the oral agreement, that
tape recording satisfies the requirements of [section 8-319]. This
conclusion we reach by taking into account the fact that "[tihe purpose of
the statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations
depending for their evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses."
We think and we hold that when the parties to an oral contract agree
that the oral contract shall be tape recorded, the contract is "reduced to
tangible form" when it is placed on the tape.... So, we hold that even if
the signed correspondence were insufficient to get around the statute
[which it isn't], the tape recording of the oral contract would be a
"reduction to tangible form" under the provisions of the U.C.C. Probably
the opposite result would be required under historical statutes of frauds
which do not contain the tangible form language of this somewhat unusual
definition ofthe word "written." However, under this statute, we think that
the tape recorded agreement meets its requirements.96

93. Id. at 829 (Hines, J., dissenting).
94.348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972).
95. Id. at 1228. The 1994 Revision of Article 8 repealed the prior writing requirement of section
8-319. See U.C.C. § 8-113 (1994) (making the Statute ofFrauds inapplicable to securities transactions).
96. Ellis, 348 F. Supp. at 1228 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). The U.C.C. provision
discussed in the case defined the terms "written" or "writing" as a printing, typewriting, or any other
intentional reduction to tangible form. See U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1995). Accord Londono v. City of
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However, two New York cases have held that tape recorded conversations do
not satisfy the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds. In Sonders v.
RoosevelP7 the court held, without discussion, that a recorded telephone
conversation is not a note or memorandum in writing as required by the Statute of
Frauds.98 In Roos v. Aloi 99 the court, noting that it was bound by the decision in
Sonders, held that a tape recorded conversation .during which one stockholder
promised to purchase the stock of another did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds.'
Even if a tape recording might be a writing for purposes of the Statute of
Frauds, the more difficult issue is whether and how it could be signed. In Ellis
Canning Co. the court, after concluding that the tape recorded telephone
conversation constituted a writing, also held that under the circumstances, the
requirement of a signing was also satisfied.' ' The court reasoned: "We do not
overlook the requirement for signature contained in the statute, but the clear purpose
of this is to require identification of the contracting party, and where,las here, the
identity of the oral contractors is established, and, in fact, admitted, the tape itself
is enough."'"
However, in Swink & Co. v. CarrollMcEntee & McGinley, Inc. 3 the court
assumed that the tape recording could be an "intentional reduction to tangible form"
and thus qualify as a writing,"' but held that it did not comply with the requirement
that it be "signed by... the party against whom enforcement is sought."'0 5
5. Computer Records and Other WritingIssues
Although no court has yet determined whether a computer-stored or computergenerated record satisfies the Statute of Frauds, a few courts have equated computer
records with writings for purposes of other statutes. For example, in Clyburn v.
Allstate InsuranceCo. "°a South Carolina statute made cancellation of an insurance
policy contingent on the insurer giving ten days written notice to the insured and to
the agent of record.'0 7 The insurer sought to cancel the insured's policy and sent
Written notice to the insured and a computer disk containing the cancellation notice

Gainesville, 768 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.4 (1 th Cir. 1985) (stating that a tape recording satisfies Statute
of Frauds).
97. 476 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. Div. 1984), affd mem., 487 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (1985).

98. Id. at 331-32. Judge Kupferman dissented inpart and opined that a tape recording is of such
apermanent nature as to satisfy the purposes of the Statute. Id. at 332.
99. 487 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1985).

100. Id. at 642-43.
101. Ellis, 348 F. Supp. at 1228.
102. Id.
103. 584 S.W.2d 393 (Ark. 1979).
104. Id. at 399.
105. Id.

106. 826 F. Supp. 955 (D.S.C. 1993).
107. Id. at 956.
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to the agent. The court determined that the disk satisfied the statutory requirement
of written notice.'0 8
Similarly, in Wilkens v. Iowa InsuranceCommissioner"' anumber of insurance
agents sued an insurer for allegedly violating Iowa insurance law by having many
of its policies countersigned by a computer-generated, typewritten signature of a
single agent, thus depriving the plaintiffs of their commission for countersigning. "
The Iowa statute in question required a signature, and the court held that the
computer-generated signature satisfied this requirement.' The court stated:
We find the fact that the signature is computer-generated rather than
hand-signed does not defeat the purpose of the act. The issue is not how
the name is placed on a sheet of paper; rather, the issue is whether the
person whose name is affixed intends to be bound. No one argues that the
agent whose name was affixed did not intend to be bound. We find the
signature requirements of the statute were met."'
The plaintiffs also alleged that the insurer had failed to comply with an Iowa statute
requiring insurers to keep "a written record of each transaction" subject to
inspection by the Commissioner of Insurance, because the insurer kept the records
in its computer system."' The court approved the Commissioner's determination
that the insurer complied with the law and stated: "[The Iowa statute] originated in
1939. We recognize, as the commissioner argues, that methods of doing business
have changed considerably since the time of the enactment of the statute. The
advent ofthe computer age has resulted in businesses making substantial changes
' 4
in record-keeping procedures." "
However, a recent federal case involving bankruptcy law is a cautionary note

that courts are not ready to equate a computer-generated record with a writing for
all purposes. In In re Kaspar"' debtors applied for a line of credit and a credit card
over the telephone." 6 In response to questions asked by the creditor's employee,
they provided financial information which the creditor's employee entered into a
computer. The debtors never saw the computer generated summary of information.
The creditor then issued the line of credit and the credit card. When the debtors filed

108. Id. at 956-57.
109. 457 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1990).
110.Id. at2.
11.Id. at 3.
112.Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 4; see also Colorado v.Avila, 770 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Colo.Ct.App.1988) (computer
disk is a written instrument for the purpose ofthe forgery statute); Illinois v. Rushton, 626 N.E.2d 1378,
1389 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (computer-generated blood alcohol test results satisfy the writing requirement
of the criminal DUI statute).
115. Bellco First Fed. Credit Union v. Kaspar (In re Kaspar), 125 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 1997).
116. Id. at 1359.
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for bankruptcy, the creditor sought an order declaring its debts nondischargeable
based on misrepresentations made to it by the debtors. The bankruptcy court denied
the order and found that the creditor had failed to meet its requirement of showing
that the materially false statement was a "statement in writing" as required by
§ 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code! 17 The court framed the question and its
answer in this fashion:
This appeal presents the question of whether modem technology and
business practices grounded in convenience will prevail over the strict
language of statutory law. In particular, we address whether a computer
generated statement of financial condition given in an application for credit
neither seen nor signed by the debtor constitutes "a writing" under
§ 523(a)(2)(B) ofthe Bankruptcy Code.... We believe the statute must be
literally interpreted, and the oral statements made by the debtor which led
to the computer generated form are not to be regarded as the functional
equivalent of a "writing" within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(B)."'
The court based its decision on a number of considerations. First, the court cited
authority that the writing had to be prepared by the bankrupt, signed by the
bankrupt, or written by someone else, but adopted and used by the debtor." 9
Second, the court noted the ordinary rule that exceptions to discharge should be
narrowly construed. 2 Third, the court noted that "giving a statement of financial
condition is a solemn part of significant credit transactions; therefore, it is only
natural that solemnity be sanctified by a document which the debtor either prepares
or sees and adopts.'' More significant, however, are observations the court made
about the absence of a paper record:
In a world where important decisions relating to the extensions of credit
and service will be made upon the contents of a statement relating to
financial condition, too much mischief can be done by either party to the
transaction were it [not required that the writing be prepared or seen and
adopted by the debtor]. Somewhere in the commercial risk allocation
picture, the writing must stand as a bulwark which tends to protect both
sides.
A creditor who forsakes that protection, abandoning caution and sound
business practices in the name of convenience, may find itself without

117. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (1993).
118. Kaspar, 125 F.3d at 1359.
119. Id. at 1361 (citing 4 COLLIERONBANKRupTCY 523.08[2][a] (15th ed. rev. 1997)). But see
Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank v. Graham (In re Graham), 122 B.R. 447,451 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
120. Kaspar, 125 F.3d at 1361.
121. Id.
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protection."2
To date, no reported case has addressed the issue whether a computer record is
signed or how such a signing might occur.
6.

Lessonsfrom Cases Involving EarlierTechnologies

The cases involving emerging technologies and the Statute of Frauds clearly
send conflicting signals about the likelihood that courts will find that electronic
commerce messages satisfy the current requirements of the Statute of Frauds. On
the one hand, courts have generally been hesitant to invalidate transactions on
Statute of Frauds grounds where the court was convinced that the use of the
particular technology involved was widespread." Likewise, courts have been

willing to look to the reliability of the particular technology and hold it satisfies the
Statute of Frauds if it is comparable to the reliability of handwritten, paper-based

documents. 24 Finally, with respect to the requirement of a signature, courts have
found that typewritten, printed symbols are the equivalent of a handwritten
signature on telegrams'2 5 and telexes,' 26 and have even held that a tape recording is
signed if the voices thereon are identified and the parties admit the existence of the
conversation.' 27 Many commentators have concluded that electronic commerce
messages would satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.'

122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117, 128-29 (S.D. Cal. 1948)
(telecopier); Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co. v. Estate of Short, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1021 (Sup. Ct.
1992), aff'd mem., 619 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1994), rev'd, 663 N.E.2d 633 (1996) (facsimile
transmission); La Mar Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Credit & Commodity Corp., 216 N.Y.S.2d 186, 190 (City
Ct 1961) (telegram).
124. See, e.g., Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990, 993-94 (Pa. 1989) (mailgram is a signed
writing forpurposes of Statute ofFrauds). However, given that an electronic commerce transaction will
not generate a paper record, this rationale may be less applicable to such transactions than to telegrams,
telexes, or faxes, where the semipermanent nature of the machine-imprinted paper provides inherent
indicia ofreliability. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Hillstrom v. Gosnay, 614 P.2d 466,469 (Mont 1980); Hansen v. Hill, 340 N.W.2d
8, 12 (Neb. 1983); Hessenthaler,564 A.2d at 993.
126. See Joseph Denunzio FruitCo., 79 F. Supp. at 128-29.
127. See Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D. Colo. 1972).
128.4 CAROLrNEN. BRoWN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 23.1, at 762-64 &n.1 1 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., 1997); FORD &BAUM, supra note 1,§ 3.3, at 44 ("[Tihe combination ofjudicial acceptance ofnew
technology, the development of trade usage, and legislative and administrative enactments suggests that
electronically formed agreements will be found to constitute enforceable contracts for most statute of
frauds purposes."); Homing, supra note 74, at 299; Houston Putnam Lowry, Does Computer Stored
Data Constitute a Writing for the Purposes of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills?, 9
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 105-07 (1982); Robert W. McKeon, Jr., Electronic Data
Interchange: Uses and LegalAspects in the Commercial Arena, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 511, 532-33 (1994) (EDI transactions); Morrison, supra note 9, at 662 (1992) (EDI
transactions); John Robinson Thomas, Note, Legal Responses to Commercial Transactions Employing
Novel Communications Media, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1159-60, 1164 (1992) (fax and e-mail
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On the other hand, communication technologies of the past, with the exception
of the tape recordings, have all involved the production of a paper-based written
message as the final product, whether telegram, telex printout, or faxed
document.' 29 It is, therefore, not a great step from holding that a handwritten, paper
document satisfies the Statute of Frauds to the conclusion that a typewritten version
of a message transmitted electronically also satisfies the Statute of Frauds.
Electronic commerce messages, however, are not produced on paper. Indeed,
one of the primary advantages of electronic commerce is that it is no longer
necessary to retain paper documents to memorialize transactions. 3 ' It is, therefore,
much harder for courts to conclude that electronic commerce messages are writings
as required by the Statute of Frauds. In addition, even if a paper printout of the
electronic message is produced, the difficult question of how such paper can be
signed remains, particularly after the New York Court of Appeals decision in
Parma Tile,' which held that machine-generated symbols do not constitute a
signing for Statute of Frauds purposes.'
This difficulty is highlighted by the split of authority about whether a tape
recording can constitute a writing.' One court has held that a tape recorded
conversation was the equivalent of a writing, emphasizing the reliability of the
evidence to establish the terms of the contract,' whereas two other cases have
summarily held that a tape recording is not a note or memorandum required by the
particular statute in question.' Furthermore, even if a tape recording might be a
writing, because it does not result in a paper document, there is the possibility that
courts will find that it is not signed.'36 Similarly, an electronic message that is not
reprinted on paper presents the likelihood that courts may conclude that the message
is not a signed writing.' 37 Accordingly, there is a substantial likelihood that courts

transactions).
129. Modem variations on the telex and fax allow for the message to be stored in a receiving
computer terminal, rather than being printed on paper, but none of the reported cases approving these
technologies involved such an arrangement.
130. See WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 2.4, at 2:6-:7.
131.590 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1992), affdmem., 619 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1994), revd,
663 N.E.2d 633, 635 (1996).
132. See supranotes 88-89 and accompanying text.
133. See supranotes 94-105 and accompanying text.
134. See Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D. Colo. 1972).
135. Roos v. Aloi, 487 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Sonders v. Roosevelt, 476 N.Y.S.2d 331
(App. Div. 1984), affdmem., 487 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1985).
136. See Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Ark. 1979).
137. Of course, it is usually possible to print out a paper copy of the electronic message once a

party has denied the existence of the contract and argue that the paper printout satisfies the Statute of
Frauds. Normally, the memorandum need not be created contemporaneously with the formation of the
agreementto satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 2 CoRIN,supranote 73, § 503, at 714-15. However, if the
memorandum is prepared and filed after the initiation of a legal proceeding, it may be too late for the
enforcement of the contract in that proceeding. Id § 503, at 715 (authorities cited). But see 4 BROwN,
supranote 128, § 22.8, at 744 ("There is good evidence that the old rule disallowing memoranda made
after the filing of a complaint has become an anachronism.").
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may balk at finding that electronic messages satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Even if courts should determine that electronic messages are sufficient to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds, those determinations would occur on a case-by-case basis
over a period of years. Given the existing reluctance of parties to engage in
electronic commerce, it is unlikely that enough courts would decide that electronic
messages satisfy the Statute of Frauds to give much comfort to business persons in
the foreseeable future.' Therefore, it is essential that legislatures examine the
relation of electronic commerce to the Statute of Frauds. This Article next evaluates
the two alternatives-repeal or amendment of the Statute of Frauds-that
legislatures are faced with in this area.
B. Repeal the Statute ofFrauds
Although commentators have long advocated repeal of the Statute of Frauds,"19
and despite its repeal in England 4 ' and its omission from the United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods,141 the practical likelihood of
complete repeal ofthe Statute of Frauds in the United States is nil for a number of
reasons.
First, attempts to remove the writing requirement with respect to contracts for
the sale of goods have met substantial opposition in the recent Article 2 amendment
process. The Article 2 Drafting Committee has reversed its long-standing position
favoring repeal of the Statute of Frauds in favor of keeping a Statute of Frauds
requirement, albeit subject to several exceptions.142 Second, the drafters of proposed
Article 2B, dealing with licenses of information, have repeatedly reaffirmed the
need for certain Statute of Frauds requirements." The drafters explained:
[T]he need for statute of frauds protection is greater in information

contracts than in the sale of goods, however. This is true because of the

138. The history of the telegraph does not give much encouragement. It was forty or fifty years
after the invention of the telegraph before a majority of state courts had affirmed that a telegram could
be a writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds and, as late as 1979, a state court held that a telegram did
not satisfy the Statute of Frauds because it was not signed. See Pike Indus. v. Middlebury Assocs., 398
A.2d 280, 282 (Vt. 1979).
139. See supra sources cited in note 2.
140. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954,2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34 (Eng.). The statute
retained the writing requirement for suretyship and land sale contracts.
141. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale ofGoods, April 11,1980,
art. 11, 19 I.L.M. 668, 674 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988).
142. U.C.C. § 2-201 (Discussion Draft Apr. 14, 1997). This draft, accompanied by a
memorandum from the Reporter, Professor Richard E. Speidel, was submitted for discussion at the 74th
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute. At that meeting, a motion to repeal section 2-201's
writing requirement was defeated by a vote of 143 to 78. Actions Taken with Respect to Drafts
Submittedat1997AnnualMeeting(visitedMay3,1998) <http://www.ali.org/ali/AMACTION.HTM>.
143. See U.C.C. § 2B-201 (Proposed Discussion Draft Nov. 1, 1997) (requiring a record
authenticated by the party against which enforcement is sought).
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character of the subject matter, the threat of infringement, and the split
interests involved in a license with ownership of intellectual property rights
vesting in one party while rights to use or possess a copy of the intangible
may vest in another party. These considerations buttress other arguments
against repeal which include primarily the idea that the fraudulent practices
and unfounded claims that this rule prevents justify the cost and that the
statute codifies and encourages what might be regarded as desirable
business practice.'"
Third, no state has entirely repealed the Statute of Frauds.
These developments indicate that there is something deeply ingrained in the
American commercial legal culture that adheres to the requirement of a writing (or
its electronic equivalent), making repeal of the Statute of Frauds unlikely. In
addition to these impediments to repeal the Statute of Frauds, there are also
compelling policy reasons why it should be retained, in some revised form, with
respect to electronic commerce. In order to understand why, it is necessary to
review some of the principal arguments surrounding the purposes and effects of the
Statute of Frauds as well as the arguments frequently advanced to support its repeal.
1.

The FunctionsofForm andthe Requirementof a Signed Writing

Although the prevention of perjured testimony of oral promises justified the
original Statute of Frauds,'45 modem commentators have correctly pointed out that
the Statute's formal requirements serve many purposes. In the most thoughtful work
on this subject, Professor Joseph Perillo has explained that formal requirements
generally can serve nine distinguishable functions in the law of contracts.'46
Professor Perillo concluded that the Statute of Frauds, as one type of formal
requirement, served two of these functions reasonably well, three of the functions
only modestly, and four of the functions only in rare circumstances or not at all. 147
Professor Perillo stated that "the Statute of Frauds serves the psychological and

144. Id. reporter's note 1.
145. Willis, supra note 2, at 429. The reasons giving rise to this perceived need are generally
described as the seventeenth century's uncontrolled discretion ofjuries, the rule prohibiting testimony
by interested parties or their families, and the general lack of development of contract law during this
period. Id. at 429-31. This familiar litany of reasons behind the Statute is traceable to Sir William
Holdsworth. See 6 WILLIM HOLDSWORTH, A I-bSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 387-93 (Methuen &Co. Ltd.
and Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1971) (2d ed. 1937) (relating the Statute of Frauds to the legal atmosphere
of the seventeenth century).

146. Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute ofFrauds inthe Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of
Form, 43 FORDHAm L. REv. 39, 43-69 (1974). He denominated the functions as the psychological,
earmaring and classifying, cautionary, clarifying, managerial, publicity, educational, regulatory and
taxation, and evidentiary functions. Id.
147. Id. at 69-70.
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evidentiary functions of form reasonably well."' 48 He described the psychological
function (sometimes referred to as the magical or sacramental function) as
"impress[ing] upon the psyches of the contracting parties the rightfulness of
fulfilling their promises even if subsequently they appeared disadvantageous."' 4 9 He

noted that the psychological effects of "putting the transaction in writing should not
be minimized," even in the contemporary world. 5 '
Professor Perillo described the evidentiary function as supplying and preserving
evidence of a contract.' He noted that other methods, such as the requirement of
disinterested witnesses, would serve the same function, but not as well as the
writing requirement, which does not die and cannot be suborned. 52 Today, the
evidentiary function is probably the dominantjustification for the Statute ofFrauds.
Professor Perillo concluded that the Statute of Frauds only modestly serves the
purposes he described as earmarking, cautionary, and classifying functions. 53 The
earmarking function contemplates the determination of that point in time at which
the parties have passed beyond negotiations and have entered into an enforceable
promise.' He noted that the mere existence of a signed writing does not eliminate
uncertainty as to whether the parties have left the negotiation stage and that it does
not insure enforceability because there are additional requirements for
enforceability, principally the requirement of consideration.' 55
The cautionary function reminds the parties that they are entering into a legally
enforceable arrangement which may have certain consequences. 56 Professor Perillo
concluded that "the Statute of Frauds has influenced the habits of the nation by
encouraging the reduction of contracts to writing," and has thus had some
cautionary effect.5 7 However, he also pointed out that it does not consistently serve

this purpose, as illustrated by judicial decisions holding that a letter containing a
repudiation of an earlier oral agreement may satisfy the Statute of Frauds.'
Finally, Professor Perillo described the classifying function as allowing the
party dealing with the paper quickly to recognize that he is faced with a particular
type of legal obligation. 59 He concluded that the Statute "neither directly nor
indirectly encourages" this function."6

148. Id.
149. Id. at 45.
150. Id. at 47-48.
151. Id. at 64.
152. Perillo, supranote 146, at 68.
153. Id. at 69.

154. Id. at 4849.
155. Id. at 50.
156. Id. at 53.
157. Id. at 56.
158. Perillo, supranote 146, at 56.
159. Id. at 51. This is typically applicable to negotiable instruments, where the form requirements
of negotiability allow the prospective purchaser of commercial paper to determine whether the
instrument is negotiable or not. Id.
160. Id. at 51-52. Professor Perillo noted that, except for serving "the regulatory fimction only in
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2. The Dysfunction ofForm and the Requirement ofa Signed Writing
As Professor Perillo has noted, the functions of the Statute of Frauds must be
examined in light ofits dysfunctions. Perillo categorized the dysfunctions into three
general objections: (1) it inhibits the "sovereignty of the individual will," (2) it is
"inconvenient and slow[s] the pace of business," and (3) failure to comply with it
"permits a party to renege on his pledged word, thereby defeating the justified
expectations."'' He dismissed the first objection, noting that the common law has
16 2

never recognized the sovereignty of the individual will as a contract principle.
Professor Perillo also dismissed the second objection, noting that, for reasons

independent of the Statute of Frauds, "modem business tends to reduce its

commitments to writing."' 63 In addition, he noted that this objection might have

more force with respect to more cumbersome formal requirements, such as a seal
or notarization, but it has little force where the Statute of Frauds requires only a
written memorial of an agreement.' In contrast,Professor Perillo found the third
objection both serious and vital. When form requirements allow one party to renege
on his agreement, this may defeat the expectations of the other party, undermine the
utility of promissory exchanges, and unduly favor the party with more ready access
to legal advice.'65
3. Electronic Commerce andthe FunctionsandDysfunctions ofForm
Using Professor Perillo's categories as a framework for analysis, one can show
that the formal requirements of the Statute of Frauds, if expanded to encompass
some forms of electronic commerce, have even more utility and cause less

a special category," the Statute of Frauds does not serve the four remaining functions (regulatory,
managerial, publicity, and educational) of formal contract requirements. Id. at 69. The managerial
function, the desire of management to control the subordinates' actions through the use of prescribed
forms, is not served by the Statute of Frauds because it focuses on private rights and is not concerned
with relationships within private or public enterprises. See id. at 58-59. The publicity function, which
informs the public of a transaction, is typically associated with the recording of security interests in real
or personal property and is not served by the Statute because it does not require the public filing of
contracts. Id. at 59-60. The educational function, which is typically associated with consumerprotection statutes such as the Truth in Lending Act, ordinarily mandates written disclosure of certain
information in contracts. Id. at 60. This function is not served by the Statute. Id. at 62. Finally, the
regulatory and taxation functions, normally designed to regulate certain contracts or to impose a tax on
certain transactions, are probably only indirectly served by the provision in many Statutes of Frauds
regulating brokerage contracts, but not by any other provisions in the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 62-64.
161. Id. at70.

162. Id.
163. Perillo, supranote 146, at 70.
164. Id. The objection has even less force with respect to Article 2 of the U.C.C.'s writing
requirement, which only requires that a writing must: (1) indicate the existence of a contract for sale;
(2) specify a quantity; and (3) be signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. U.C.C. § 2201 cmt. 1 (1995).
165. Perillo, supranote 146, at 70.
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dysfunction in the case of electronic commerce than in other methods of forming
agreements.
a.

The FunctionsofFormalRequirements in ElectronicCommerce

Virtually all Statute of Frauds functions would be served by the formal
requirement that an agreement formed in an electronic commerce transaction is only
enforceable if it is evidenced by an "authenticated electronic message." For
immediate purposes, this term means an electronic message that is reliably
attributable to a particular person.
The psychological function is served by the requirement that the sender of an
electronic message in some way authenticate the message.' More importantly,
however, the evidentiary function would also be served by the requirement of an
authenticated electronic message. In electronic transactions, especially stranger-tostranger transactions, there is very little likelihood that there will be any other
evidence ofthe existence of an agreement such as prior oral conversations or letters.
Indeed, in stranger-to-stranger transactions the sole evidence of an agreement will
be the electronic messages transmitted by the parties. Because these transactions are
between people with no prior dealings, and because the transactions are conducted
without the production of a paper record, the messages themselves will be the only
evidence that can possibly be introduced in the event that one person fails to
perform. Therefore, the presence of an electronically-created record of the message
would be the most likely and, in some cases, only evidence of the agreement.
Likewise, the requirement that the electronic message be authenticated by the
person against whom the agreement is asserted would also serve the evidentiary
function. Unlike the world of paper-based commerce, where the requirement of a
signed writing most frequently serves the function of showing that an alreadyidentified person made a particular promise, in the electronic commerce world, a
requirement of an authenticated electronic message serves not only this function but
the more fundamental function of identifying the person making the promise
contained in the message in the first place. This additional function is critical in
electronic commerce because there are few other methods of establishing the source
of an electronic message. As mentioned earlier, it is very easy to spoof a receiving
computer by impersonating another person with a different e-mail address. 67
Hence, the only way to begin to identify the source of a message is a requirement
that the message bear some symbol or other mark that serves in some way to
identify the sender.

166. Id. at 48.
167. See Oei, supra note 50, at 32.
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b. The Dysfunctions ofForm in Electronic Commerce
Of the three dysfunctions identified by Professor Perillo, 68 one is important in
electronic transactions, and one is virtually meaningless in such transactions. First,
the claimed dysfunction that formal requirements limit the scope of freedom of
conduct makes as little sense in the electronic world as it does in the paper-based

world.
However, the second claimed dysfunction-that formal requirements slow
down the free flow of commerce-is a legitimate concern with respect to electronic
transactions. To the extent that the Statute of Frauds requires the preservation of
paper records of agreements, it is inconsistent with the emerging business practice
of retaining only electronic records. Hence, unless the writing requirement is
revised to validate at least some forms of electronic commerce, the Statute ofFrauds
will make business more expensive, less competitive, and less efficient by inhibiting
the growth of electronic commerce. This has impelled the movement to reform the
Statute of Frauds to accommodate electronic transactions. However, a different
formal requirement, adapted to the practices of electronic commerce and freed of
the paper requirement, would not likely slow down commerce.
The third dysfunctional aspect of formal contract requirements is preventing
enforcement of agreements actually entered into without observing the formal
requirements. As Perillo noted, this is a very powerful objection to the Statute of
Frauds, because the absence of a writing satisfying the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds can defeat justified expectations based on otherwise enforceable oral
agreements.' 69
In the context of electronic commerce, however, this dysfunction of the Statute
of Frauds simply does not apply. The premise of the argument of defeating
expectations is that there is reliable evidence of a contract's existence through
testimony of the existence of an oral agreement and that this testimony is excluded
when the court rules as a matter of law that any agreement is unenforceable due to
the absence of a writing. In other words, the absence of the required form prevents
the proof of the substance of the transaction through other, presumably reliable,
means.
With respect to open electronic commerce transactions, 7 ' particularly strangerto-stranger transactions, there will ordinarily be no evidence of the agreement other
than the electronic messages exchanged. Because the transactions will frequently
be isolated transactions between persons with no history of dealing, the substance

168. Perillo, supranote 146, at 70.
169. Id.
170. With respect to EDI transactions, there will frequently be a master EDI agreement that
provides some substantial basis for believing testimony about a subsequent transaction conducted
pursuant to the master agreement. See The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial
Use ofElectronicDatalnterchange-AReportandModel TradingParinerAgreement,45 Bus.LAw.
1645, 1717-49 (1990) (proposing a model EDI master agreement).
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of the transaction will be encompassed in the form of the messages exchanged. In
other words, the difference between the form of the agreement and the substance
of the agreement disappears with respect to most electronic commerce transactions.
Hence, it makes perfect sense to continue the requirement of a form, an
authenticated electronic message, to document these transactions. It is unlikely that
the absence of the formal requirement will defeat the justified expectations of the
parties unless a substantial destruction of the records of either the sender or the
recipient occurs."'
Accordingly, the primary dysfunctional aspect of formal contract requirements
does not apply with much force in the case of electronic transactions. Given that the
evidentiary function of formal contract requirements is substantially advanced by
requiring some authenticated electronic message, the case for revising the Statute
of Frauds, rather than repealing it, is compelling.

C. Amend the Statute of Fraudsto Validate ElectronicCommerce
As demonstrated, the practical likelihood of a repeal of the Statute of Frauds is
very small, and would not facilitate the proof of electronic commerce agreements.
Instead, the focus of recent legislative developments has been to amend the Statute
of Frauds in an attempt to validate electronic commerce transactions. Virtually all
of the legislative developments have been at the state or uniform-law level. There
has been little interest in federal legislation on the topic, 72 in part because of the
current political climate and a recognition that premature national regulation may
stifle the natural, evolving market forces which produce new models of electronic
commerce that are both cost-efficient and reliable.7 3 Furthermore, because
electronic commerce is international in scope, there have been efforts at the
international level to deal with the legality of electronic commerce transactions."

171. Under the Statute of Frauds, the contract remains enforceable even though the writing is lost
or destroyed, and the contents of the writing may be proven by parol testimony. 4 BROWN, supranote
128, § 23.10, at 827. One could reasonably assume that this doctrine would also apply to electronic
messages that otherwise satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
172. An exception is the so-called "Baker Bill." Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of
1997, H.R 2937 105th Cong., (1998) (section-by-section summary available at
<http://www.house.gov/banking/hr2937ss.htm>). This bill establishes four criteria for electronic
authentication to be valid and entitled to legal recognition. Id. § 6. It provides that any form of
electronic authentication comporting with such standards "shall have standing equal to written
signatures with respect to all communications with any agency or instrumentality of the United States
government or with any U.S. Court." Id. § 5. It then provides: "Similarly, unless expressly prohibited
by the laws of a state, any form of electronic communication that comports with the standards ....
shall have standing equal to written signatures for purposes of any law." Id.
173. Information Security Committee, American Bar Ass'n, States'Role in DevelopingDigital
SignaturesPoliciesandStandards(July 31,1997) <http://www.abanet.org/scitech.ec/isc/stateds.html>.

174. See, e.g., UnitedNations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model
Law on Electronic Commerce (visited May 3, 1998)
<http'//www3.un.or.at/uncitralltexts/electcom/ml-ec.htm#TOP> (applying to all information used in
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These international efforts have had substantial influence on the drafting of state
laws.
This Article, however, focuses on uniform and state-law developments. These
developments have involved two distinct issues: (1) equating electronic messages
with signed writings for purposes of the Statute of Frauds; and (2) specifying
consequences of the use of more secure forms of electronic communication as a
method of proving that a particular individual in fact authored an electronic
message. There has been remarkable agreement in legislation addressing the first
of these issues, while the second of these issues has produced a wide variety of
legislative responses. This portion of the article examines and analyzes these
developments.' 75
1.

Legislative Efforts to Equate Electronic Records with Signed
Writings

All uniform legislation and most state legislation dealing with electronic
commerce equates electronic messages with writings and makes provision for
electronic messages being signed. The intended result is that an electronic message
will satisfy the Statute of Frauds requirements of a writing that is signed. Although
this result is nearly universal, the drafters of this legislation have used different, and
sometimes confusing, terminology. Issues have also arisen about whether to exclude
certain types of transactions from this legislation.
a. The Uniform Commercial Code
Electronic commerce issues have arisen in the drafting of revised Article 2 and
proposed Article 2B of the U.C.C., as well as revised Article 2A on the leasing of
goods. Presently, each of the three articles contains a Statute ofFrauds provision.' 76
The three drafting committees have coordinated their efforts with respect to
electronic commerce issues and have now arrived at common definitions of critical
terms used in the respective Statutes of Fraud. The critical development is the
replacement of the existing concept of a "writing" that is "signed" with the concept
of a "record" that is "authenticated."
Revised Articles 2 and 2A and proposed Article 2B use the term "record" as a
substitute for the former requirement of a writing. Record is defined in Article 2B
as: "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium, or stored in an electronic
or other medium and retrievable in perceivable form."' 77 This definition is designed

commercial activities).
175. In order to meet publication deadlines, this article only examines legislative developments
through April 15, 1998.
176. U.C.C. § 2-201 (Annual Meeting Draft 1997); U.C.C. § 2A-201 (Annual Meeting Draft
1997); U.C.C. § 2B-201 (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998).

177. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(38) (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998).
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to include those things that would currently constitute a writing under the U.C.C.
as well as to encompass electronically stored information so long as it meets the
"retrievable in perceivable form" requirement.
Revised Articles 2 and 2A and proposed Article 2B also use the term
"authenticate" as a substitute for the former requirement that something be signed.
Authenticate is defined as
to sign, execute or adopt a symbol or sound, or encrypt or process a record
in whole or part, with intent by the authenticating person to: (A) identify
that person; (B) adopt or accept a record or term that contains the
authentication or to which a record containing the authentication refers; or
(C) attest to the integrity of a record or term that contains the
authentication or to which a record containing the authentication refers."'
With these definitions of "authenticate" and "record", the drafters of revised
Articles 2 and 2A and proposed Article 2B have simply provided that certain
contracts for the sale or lease of goods or licenses of information must be evidenced
by a "record authenticated by the party against which enforcement is sought."'79
Presently, Article 2B goes even farther and provides that "[a] record or
authentication may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely on
the ground that it is in electronic form."'"8 The purpose of this section is "to avoid
any uncertainty about the efficacy of electronic records and signatures under state
law as they apply to transactions covered by Article 2B..''
The most recent draft of proposed Article 2B has a series of "scope" sections
that exclude certain transactions from coverage. Presently, the principal exclusion
from coverage relates to agreements relating to core banking, payment, and
financial services activities, including access to, use, transfer, clearance, settlement
or processing of funds, instruments, or items.'82 In addition, proposed Article 2B
also provides that its provisions are subject to any
conflicting state statute or
83
regulation that "establishes a consumer protection."'

178. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(3) (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998). The current drafts ofrevised section
2-102(a)(1) of the Annual Meeting Draft 1997, and revised section 2A-102(a)(1) of the Annual
Meeting Draft 1997, are slightly different. However, because the drafters of revised Articles 2 and 2A
have simply incorporated subsequent developments in proposed Article 2B, one should anticipate that
the definitions will ultimately conform exactly to that in Article 2B.
179. U.C.C. § 2B-201(a) (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998); U.C.C. § 2-201(a), (Annual Meeting
Draft 1997); U.C.C. § 2A-201(a) (Annual Meeting Draft 1997).
180. U.C.C. § 2B-113 (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998).
181. U.C.C. § 2B-114, reporter's note (Proposed DraftNov. 1, 1997). This provision is expected
to become part of an electronic commerce package of sections that will ultimately be adopted in
Articles 2 and 2A as well. Id.
182. U.C.C. § 2B-103A(4)(a)-(E) (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998).
183. Id. § 2B-104(a)(2).
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b. The Uniform Electronic TransactionsAct
In 1996, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
appointed a committee to draft a new uniform act addressing questions of legally
enforceable transactions consummated by electronic means. The drafting committee
circulated three drafts of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) for
comment.
The UETA reaches essentially the same result as the U.C.C., but uses slightly
different terminology. The present draft of the proposed act defines an "electronic
record" as "a record created, stored, generated, received, or communicated by
electronic means."'" The UETA then provides: "(a) A record may not be denied
legal effect, validity or enforceability solely because it is an electronic record. (b)
If a rule of law requires a record to be in writing, or provides consequences if it is
not, an electronic record satisfies that rule."' 5
With respect to the requirement that a writing be signed, the current draft of the
UETA defines "signature" as:
any symbol, sound, process, or encryption of a record in whole or in part,
executed or adopted by a person or the person's electronic agent with intent to:
(A) identify that person; (B) adopt or accept a term or a record; or (C) establish
the informational integrity of a record or term that contains the signature or to
86
which a record containing the signature refers.
An "electronic signature" is defined as "any signature in electronic form, attached
to or logically associated with an electronic record."'8 7 The UETA then provides:
A signature may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely
because it is in the form of an electronic signature.'88
If a rule of law requires a signature, or provides consequences in the
absence of a signature, the rule of law is satisfied with respect to an electronic
record if the electronic record includes an electronic signature. 89
Hence, the UETA generally equates records with writings and validates electronic
signatures for purposes of the Statute of Frauds.

184. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANsAcIONS ACT § 102(7) (Discussion Draft Mar. 23, 1998)
[hereinafter UETA]. A "record" is defined as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or
that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." Id. § 102(16).
185. Id. § 201(a), (b).
186. Id. § 102(20). The UETA defines "sign" as "to execute or adopt a signature." Id. § 102(19).

187. Id. § 102(8).
188. Id. § 301(a).
189. Id. § 301(b).
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An earlier draft of the UETA contained a "scope" section that applied only to
"any commercial or governmental transaction" that was intended by the drafters to
exclude coverage of issues relating to the execution of wills and trusts.'" However,
the current draft of the UETA deletes the limitation to "commercial and
governmental transaction"; instead, the drafters ofthe UETA have appointed atask
force to draw up a list of excluded transactions.'
c. State Law Developments
About forty states have either enacted, or are considering, some form of
legislation dealing with state-law requirements of signed writings in the electronic
commerce context.192 Two models have emerged with respect to whether electronic
messages satisfy the Statute of Frauds. One is based on the landmark Utah Digital
Signature Act. 3 The other model is broader in scope, with results similar to those
under the uniform acts previously discussed.
(1) The Utah Model: Validating Only ElectronicMessages
with DigitalSignatures

Utah adopted the Digital Signature Act in 1995."94 The Utah statute was the
first comprehensive attempt to conform the writing and signature requirements of
the Statute of Frauds to the needs of electronic commerce and is the model for
legislation adopted in Minnesota and Washington. 95 In order to understand the
Utah statute, and others modeled on it, it is necessary to understand the concept of
a "digital signature."
The use of digital signatures in electronic commerce is largely the result of
efforts of the Information Security Committee of the American Bar Association's
Section of Science and Technology (ISC). The ISC drafted the Digital Signature
Guidelines in 1995 and revised them in 199696 The Digital Signature Guidelines
190. UNIFORMELECTRONICTRANSACrlONS ACT §§ 103,104, reporter's note 4 (Discussion Draft
Nov. 1, 1997).
191. UETA, supra note 184, § 103, reporter's note 2.
192. A number ofstates have enacted statutes that simply allow certain forms ofelectronic records
to be used by, or submitted to, branches of the state government. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 41-121
(1996) (allowing Secretary of State to approve "digital Signatures" for use by state agencies; 15 ILL
CoMN. STAT. 405/14.01 (1997) (allowing electronic signatures on communications between state
agencies and the State Controller). Because these statutes do not deal with private transactions subject
to the Statute of Frauds, this article will not discuss them.
193. UTAH CODEANN. § 46-3-101 to -504 (Supp. 1997).
194. Id.
195. 1997 Minn. Laws § 325 Y.001; WASH. REv. CODE § 19.34.010 (1997).
196. INFORMATION SECURITY COMMIrEE, AMEmCAN BAR ASS'N, DIGITAL SIGNATURE
GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE (1996) [hereinafter DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES].
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served as a model for the Utah statute.
A digital signature is not a version of a handwritten signature; instead, it is an
encryption of the text of an electronic message which is appended to the message
itself. 7 The digital signature is based on public key cryptography-the use oftwo
codes (known as "keys") to send and receive messages. One of the keys, the
"private" key, is kept solely in the possession of the sender of a message and is used
to encode the text of the message into the digital signature.'98 Another key, the
"public" key, is made publicly available to persons who may be dealing with the
sender of the message. The public and private keys are mathematically related, but
the relationship is so complicated that is "computationally infeasible" to deduce one
key solely from knowledge of the other key.' Hence, the recipient of a message
encrypted with the private key has ready access to the public key, but cannot deduce
the private key from the public key.2"°
The keys are such that the digital signature created by one key can only be
decrypted by the other key. Hence, a person receiving a digitally-signed document
verified by use of the public key knows that a person possessing the private key sent
the message.2' The digital signature thus provides very reliable evidence of the
source of an electronic message, assuming that the recipient has a reliable way of
verifying the person with whom the private key is associated.
Verification of the person with whom the private key is associated is
accomplished through the use of a trusted third party known as a "certification
2 2 The role
authority" or "CA.""
of the CA is to verify the identity of a person
possessing a key pair and then publish a "certificate"--an electronic record listing
the public key as the subject of the certificate and confirming that the prospective
signer identified in the certificate holds the corresponding private key.2"° This
certificate is then made publicly available in a "repository"" ° maintained by the CA
197. More precisely, the electronic message is first condensed into a shorter form of digital
representation, known as a "hash result," using an algorithm known as a "hash function." This hash
result is then encrypted by the sender of the electronic message and it is the encrypted form of the hash

result that is appended to the message. Id.at 9-12. This is known as the digital signature. Id.The reason
for using the hash result is that the encryption uses such long numbers that there would be a tremendous
drain on computing power if the entire message were encrypted. In order to be effective, hash functions
must be truly "one-way'--it must be "computationally infeasible" to derive the text of the message
which hashes to a given result. FoRD & BAUM, supra note 1, § 4.3, at 115-16.
198. DIGrrAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 196, at 10.
199. Id. at 10 n.23.
200. Id. at 10.
201. The recipient verifies the digital signature by taking the text of the electronic message and
converting it into ahash result using the same hash function as the sender and then applying the public
key to the hash result. The process results in verification only if the original message is encrypted by
the use of a private key to which the public key is related. Id. at 12-13.
202. Id. at 17.
203. Id. at 17-18. For an exceptionally thoughtful preview of the likely issues raised by
certification authorities and their activities, see A. Michael Froomkin, The EssentialRole of Trusted
Third Partiesin Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. Rev. 49 (1996).
204. "Repositories" are online databases of certificates and other information available for
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or someone else. A recipient of a digitally signed message will access the certificate
and determine that a public key is associated with a private key possessed by a
particular person, obtain a copy of that public key, and then use that public key to
decrypt the digitally signed message the recipient received. By decrypting the digital
signature, the public key exhibits extraordinarily reliable evidence that the message
was in fact sent by a person in possession of the private key which the CA has
verified as being associated with that public key.2 "5
In addition to being a reliable method of identifying the source of an electronic
message, a digital signature is. also very good evidence that the message has not
been tampered with since transmission. Because the digital signature is an
encryption of the message itself, any alteration of a digitally signed message will
cause the public key to fail to decrypt the digital signature, thus indicating to the
recipient that the message has been altered since it was digitally signed.2"
Hence, assuming that the CA has done an appropriate job of verifying the
identity of the person associated with a public key (subscriber) and assuming that
the subscriber has exercised reasonable care to prevent the loss or compromise of
the private key, the use of digitally-signed messages provides an extraordinarily
reliable method of validating both the source and the content of an electronic
message.
Because of their reliability, digital signatures are the cornerstone of the Utah
statute. Under the Utah statute, a digitally signed message satisfies both the
requirement of a "writing" and a "signing" if the digital signature has been verified
by reference to the public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed CA. 7
The Utah statute provides that "[n]othing in this chapter precludes any symbol from
being valid as a signature under other applicable law, including Uniform
Commercial Code, Subsection 70A-1-201(39).""2 8 Furthermore, "[n]othing in this
chapter precludes any message, document, or record from being considered written
or in writing under other applicable state law." 2" However, these provisions merely
authorize courts to conclude that other forms of electronic messages may satisfy the
requirements of a "signed writing." These provisions are not an affirmative

legislative direction mandating this conclusion, as is the case under the uniform
laws previously discussed. Accordingly, it remains unclear whether, in Utah, an

electronic message that is not digitally signed can be considered either "written" or

retrieval and use in verifying digital signatures. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 196, at
19.
205. The ability to identify a particular person as the source ofan electronic message is frequently
referred to as "signer authentication." Id. at 7-8.
206. Id. at 13.
207. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-401, 403 (Supp. 1997). To qualify under the Utah statute, the
digital signature must be affixed by the signer with the intent to sign the message. Also, the recipient
cannot have notice that the signer has breached any duty it owes as a subscriber to the CA or that the
signer does not rightfully hold the private key used to affix the digital signature. Id. § 401(1)(b), (c).

208. Id. § 401(2).
209. Id. § 403(2).
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"signed."
(2) The Georgia Model: A Narrow Validation of Records
with "ElectronicSignatures"
Unlike the Utah statute, which is limited to digital signatures, the Georgia
Electronic Records and Signatures Act2 0 takes a seemingly broad approach to what
types of electronic messages may satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
According to the Georgia act, when a person accepts or agrees to be bound by an
"electronic record,"" any rule of law requiring a writing or signing shall be deemed
satisfied if the record is "executed or adopted with an electronic signature."2" 2 The
statute defines an "electronic signature" as a verification method that is "unique to
the person using it, is capable of verification, is under the sole control ofthe person
using it, and is linked to data [in the electronic message] in such a manner that if the
data are changed the electronic signature is invalidated."2 3 Hence, the act is not
limited to digital signatures, but it is narrower than the terms "authentication" and
"electronic signature" as used in the uniform acts. Because only records signed with
an electronic signature satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the Georgia act would exclude
any symbol that does not meet all four of the elements of an electronic signature.
This effectively disqualifies any electronic message that is signed simply by name
or other identifier, or that has not been appropriately linked to the electronic record.
(3) The FloridaandillinoisModel: Open-Ended Validation
Records with ElectronicSignatures
In 1996, Florida enacted its Electronic Signature Act,214 which takes a much
broader approach than either Utah or Georgia. The Florida act states that, "[u]nless
otherwise provided by law, an electronic signature may be used to sign a writing
and shall have the same force and effect as a written signature."2 5 The act defines
"electronic signature" as "any letters, characters, or symbols, manifested by
electronic or similar means, executed or adopted by a party with an intent to
authenticate a writing."2 '6 The act then amends the existing statutory definition of
"writing" to include "information which is created or stored in any electronic

210. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-12-1 to -5 (Supp. 1997).
211. A "record" is defined as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored
in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 'Record' includes both
electronic records and printed, typewritten, and tangible records." Id. § 10-12-3(2).

212. Id. § 10-12-4.
213. Id. § 10-12-3(1).
214. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.70 -.75 (West Supp. 1998).
215. Id. § 282.73.
216. Id. § 282.72(4). The act requires the electronic signature to be "logically associated" with
such writing. Id.
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' Thus, the Florida
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form."217
act treats
electronic messages identically to written messages for purposes of satisfying the
Statute of Frauds.21
In April 1996, Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan announced the formation of
the Illinois Commission on Electronic Commerce and Crime, a task force formed
to recommend legislation to the Illinois General Assembly that would encourage
electronic commerce and provide safeguards from fraud and criminal activity
involving electronic commerce. The Commission proposed the Illinois Electronic
Commerce Security Act which has been introduced into the Illinois General
Assembly.219
The proposed Illinois Act follows the Florida model by taking a very broad
view of how electronic messages satisfy the requirements of a signed writing. It
generally provides that an "electronic record"' satisfies any rule of law requiring
information to be "written" or "in writing."'" Furthermore, it states that an
"electronic signature ' m satisfies any rule of law requiring a signature.'
However, the proposed Illinois Act provides that electronic records with
electronic signatures constitute neither a "writing" nor a "signing" in three cases.
The first exception applies where treating an electronic record as a writing or an
electronic signature as a signing would "involve a construction of a rule of law that
is clearly inconsistent with the manifest intent of the lawmaking body or repugnant
to the context ofthe same rule of law." 4 The second exception applies with respect
"to any rule of law goveming the creation or execution of a will or trust, living will,
or healthcare power of attorney." s The final exception applies "to any record that

217. 1996 FLA. LAws ch. 96-224, sec. 1.01(4).
218. The Act gives the Secretary of State the power to issue "certificates for the purpose of
verifying digital signatures." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.74 (West Supp. 1998). Nonetheless, the Act
specifically provides that a public or private entity does not have to participate in the Secretary of
State's certification program to verify a digital signature. Id.
219. Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.R. 3180, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess.
(III., introduced Feb. 11, 1998), availableat (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http://www.mbe.com/ieesa.html>.
220. The proposed Illinois Act defines "electronic record" as "a record generated, communicated,
received, or stored by electronic means for use in an information system or for transmission from one
information system to another," id. § 5-105, and "record" as "information that is inscribed, stored, or
otherwise fixed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form." Id.
221.Id. § 5-115(a).
222. The proposed Illinois Act defines "electronic signature" as "a signature in electronic form
attached to or logically associated with an electronic record," id. § 5-105, and "signature" as "any
symbol executed or adopted, or any security procedure employed or adopted, using electronic means
or otherwise, by or on behalf of a person with intent to authenticate a record." Id.
223. Id. §5-120(a).
224. Id. §§ 5-1 15(b)(1), 5-120(c)(1). The proposed Illinois Act also states thatthis exception does
not apply simply because of the "mere requirement that information be 'in writing,' 'written,' or
'printed.' Id.
225. Electronic Commerce Security Act §§ 5-115(b)(2), 5-120(c)(2), H.R. 3180, 90th Gen.
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serves as a unique and transferable instrument of rights and obligations including,
without limitation, negotiable instruments and other instruments of title wherein
possession of the instrument is deemed to confer title." 6
d. Analysis of the Various Models ofEquatingElectronicRecords
with Signed Writings
If electronic commerce is to be encouraged, it is necessary that electronic
messages have legal validity equal to that of messages written on paper. All of the
statutes described above move in this direction, but in varying degrees.
The Utah statute is too narrow because it limits electronic messages that satisfy
the Statute of Frauds to those that are digitally signed. Unlike the Statute of Frauds,
which can be satisfied by virtually any piece of paper bearing some symbol that
tends to identify the defendant as a party to the contract, 227 the Utah statute requires
a specific form of signature-a digital signature. 8 While this certainly advances
the evidentiary function of the Statute of Frauds, it requires a level of reliability for
electronic messages far beyond that required by the existing Statute of Frauds. This
requirement could lead to the dysfunctional consequence ofstifling a desirable form
of commerce by requiring formalities inconsistent with the basic societal

Assembly, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (ILl., introduced Feb. 11, 1998), availableat (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http-//www.mbc.comi/iecsa.html>. The drafters believed that these types of documents require the
formalism "of ceremony (including the need for counsel and due deliberation), or the attestation to
sobriety and mental capacity and lack ofobvious compulsion that is provided by third-party witnesses."
Accordingly, the drafters concluded that until procedures are adopted to provide similar requirements
for electronic records and signatures, these items should be excluded. See id. § 5-115, cmt. 7(b).
226. 1d. §§ 5-115(b)(3), 5-120(c)(3). This exception was included because of the important rights
associated with possession of an original negotiable instrument or document of title and the present
inability to distinguish originals from copies in cases where information is sent and stored digitally.
Id. § 5-115 cmt. 7(c). However, the proposed Illinois Act creates an exception to this exclusion from
coverage if"an electronic version of such record is created, stored, and transferred in a manner that
allows for the existence of only one unique, identifiable, and unalterable original with the functional
attributes of an equivalent physical instrument, that can be possessed by only one person, and which
cannot be copied except in a form that is readily identifiable as a copy." Id. §§ 5-115(b)(3), 5120(c)(3). This exception was included to accommodate emerging technology that may provide for an
identifiable and unalterable electronic record. Id. § 5-115 cmt. 7 (c).
227. See, e.g., Zacharie v. Franklin, 37 U.S. 151, 162 (1838) (holding that a mark of"X" is a
sufficient signature); Welchv. Mitchell, 351 So. 2d 911, 915 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (holding that a preprinted name on bill of sale is a sufficient signature); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Cole, 457 A.2d 656, 662-63 (Conn. 1983) (holding that a pre-printed name on confirmation slip is a

sufficient signature); Kohlmeyer & Co. v. Bowen, 192 S.E.2d 400, 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (holding
that letterhead is sufficient to authenticate a writing); Bains v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 497
N.W.2d 263, 271 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that computer-generated letterhead satisfies the
signature requirement); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(39) crnt. 39 (noting that a "signing" may be by initials
or thumbprint). But see Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co. v. Estate of Short, 663 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y.
1996) (holding that a fax machine-generated name is not a sufficient signing).

228. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-401, 403 (Supp. 1997).
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expectations of the way transactions are to be consummated.2 9 Indeed, the Utah
statute is so narrow that even a person using software creating a digital signature
might fail to satisfy the statute because of its narrow definitions relating to the use
of digital signatures."
Likewise, the Utah statute has been criticized for not being technologically
neutral. Rather, it favors a specific technology-digital signatures-to the complete
exclusion of other forms ofelectronic communication. This approach may have the

effect ofstifling the development and acceptance of existing or future technologies
that might provide substantially equivalent assurance of the electronic message's
authenticity and content."'
Like the Utah model, the Georgia model is under-inclusive. By requiring an
"electronic signature" that satisfies the Statute of Frauds to be one that possesses the
four statutory indicia of reliability, it requires much more of an electronic message

than the current Statute of Frauds requires of a paper message. However, unlike
Utah, the Georgia statute is technologically neutral, so that technologies other than

digital signatures may qualify as an electronic signature. Unfortunately, the Georgia
model does not specify a method for determining what types of other technologies
may qualify as an electronic signature.
Presumably, the judiciary would decide the issue of a person using some other
form of signing an electronic record and claiming that it qualifies as an "electronic
signature." The likelihood of this actually occurring is small because someone
would have to risk using new technology in a transaction involving a sum of money
sufficient tojustify litigation for the purpose of establishing an acceptable electronic
signature. Hence, even though the Georgia statute may be technologically neutral,

When a required form ... is regarded as an unnecessary bit of
legalistic nonsense, it fails to serve a healthy psychological function.
No matter what other functions the form may serve (evidentiary,
cautionary, etc.), it becomes dysfunctional and will be discarded first
by the persons subject to the law and then by the law itself.
Perillo, supra note 146, at 46.
230. WRIGHT, supranote 6, § 16.7.3, at 16:32. Mr. Wright posits three situations in which the
digital signature requirements of the Utah statute would not be met. One involves the failure to utilize
a "one-way function" as part of the encryption process. Another involves a third person who creates
the one-way function, but another person who encrypts the function with his private key. The third
involves the more likely scenario of a consumer using software that includes digital signature features,
but having no idea how it works. Therefore, according to Mr. Wright, she would lack the statutorilyrequired intent to digitally sign the message. Id.
231. Id. § 16.7.3, at 16:31. For a comparison of the security risks of digital signatures and
biometric identifiers, see R.R Jueneman & R.J. Robertson, Jr., Biometricsand DigitalSignaturesin
Electronic Commerce, 38 JuuRrcs J. (forthcoming Spring 1998). For example, biometric forms
of identification, such as retinal scans or palm print scans, may in the future serve to identify the sender
of a message. Likewise, the currently available PenOp technology digitizes biometric information about
one's handwritten signature. According to its promoters, it can serve to identify the sender and
unalterably affix the sender's signature to the electronic record. See generally Benjamin Wright, Eggs
in Baskets: Distributingthe Risks ofElectronicSignatures, 15 J. MARSHALL COMPTER & INFo. L.
189, 195-98 (1997) (summarizing PenOp technology).
229.
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its practical consequences may encourage parties to use digital signatures, the only
current technology that clearly meets the definition of an electronic signature. Thus,
this consequence retards the development and use of new forms of secure electronic
communication.
A more appropriate alternative is one followed by Florida, Illinois, and the
drafters ofthe uniform acts. This approach recognizes that because almost any scrap
of paper bearing any symbol may constitute a signed writing for purposes of the
Statute of Frauds, almost any electronic message bearing any form of identifying
symbol may also constitute a "writing" that is "signed."
A final issue is the scope of the statutes designed to validate electronic
messages as satisfying the Statute of Frauds. The drafters of revised Articles 2 and
2A and of proposed Article 2B of the U.C.C. enjoy the luxury of dealing with a
single Statute of Frauds limited to the transactions within the scope of each Article.
Therefore, they can amend the Statute of Frauds by using the broad terms
"authenticate" and "record" without worrying about affecting other statutory
requirements of a writing or a signing outside the scope of the Article.
However, neither the drafters of the UETA nor the various state legislatures
could utilize this simple method to validate electronic commerce transactions.
Instead, these drafters were required to draft generally applicable statutes equating
electronic records with signed writings and to determine if the statute should
exclude some state law requirements mandating information to be in writing or
signed in transactions other than contracts subjectto the Statute ofFrauds." 2 Hence,
questions abound whether some transactions should be excluded from the allencompassing validation of electronic records and signatures.
Legislation has followed several different approaches. In Florida, the statute
equates electronic records to signed writings in virtually all cases. Apparently, this
statute encompasses documents that are not contract-based, such as wills, trusts, and
powers of attorney, as well as negotiable instruments and other documents of title
that involve the principle of negotiability and depend on the existence of a unique,
transferable original. 3
Despite the fact that all of these documents pose separate legal and practical
issues from those presented by electronic contracts, the Florida statute appears to
validate all electronic forms of such documents. The proposed Illinois Act takes the

232. Of course, it would be possible to identify each particular provision in a state code that
requires a signed writing and amend each such provision by substituting "authenticated record" for
"signed writing," but that would entail herculean effort and expense.
233. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.73 (West Supp. 1998). The Georgia statute applies to persons
who "accept or agree to be bound by an electronic record executed or adopted with an electronic
signature." GA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-4 (Supp. 1997). Accordingly, one could argue that the Georgia
statute only applies to transactions involving two persons, excluding from its scope wills, trusts, and
other unilateral acts. However, the Georgia statute clearly encompasses negotiable instruments and
documents of title, despite the conceptual difficulties associated with the concept of negotiability and
electronic commerce. See generally, LARY LAWRENCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS 34
(1997) (discussing the "signed" requirement for negotiability).
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more cautious approach of excluding these transactions, as well as giving the court
authority to exclude other transactions should the court find that the intent of the
law covering transaction is inconsistent with the use of an electronic record. This
approach avoids unintended consequences outside the contract area.
2. Legislative Efforts RegardingSecurity ProceduresUsed to Verify the
Source andContent of an ElectronicMessage
Even if an electronic message can constitute a writing and even if it contains
some electronic symbol or mark that renders it signed under the applicable Statute
of Frauds, the party seeking to enforce a promise contained in an electronic message
must prove that the record was signed by the opposing party. For transactions
outside the Statute of Frauds the plaintiffmust show that a promise was made by the
defendant. So, how does one prove the identity of the sender of an electronic
message?
Of course, a handwritten signature on a piece of paper can be verified as the
defendant's signature by eyewitnesses who saw the defendant sign the paper, by
comparison to other examples of the defendant's handwriting, by expert witness
testimony based on similar comparisons, and by circumstantial evidence derived
from the contents of the writing, indicating facts that only the defendant could
know. However, in an electronic message, the symbol or other identifying mark that
identifies the sender is a series of binary data that cannot be reliably associated with
any particular individual. Absent eyewitness testimony (which would almost never
be available), the recipient of an electronic message has avery difficult time proving
who it.
Even if one can show that the defendant sent an electronic message, a second
difficulty is proving that the electronic message introduced into evidence is the
same message. A sender can always argue that, if the message was sent over an
open network, a third person could have intercepted and altered it after it was sent
and before it was received. Alternatively, the sender can argue that the recipient
altered the information in the message after receipt. How, then, can the plaintiff
prove that the defendant signed the precise message the plaintiff seeks to introduce
at trial?
These arguments rarely arise in cases involving paper writings because of the
semipermanent nature of ink on paper and the difficulty of secretly altering the
content of the writing. However, these arguments are entirely plausible in an
electronic environment, because digital information is malleable and can be
changed in ways that are virtually impossible to detect.
The drafters of uniform legislation and state statutes relating to electronic
commerce have confronted these issues. Unfortunately, the issue of "binding" an
individual to an electronic message has led to many different and inconsistent
approaches.
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a. The Uniform CommercialCode
The drafters of proposed Article 2B 4 deal with this problem with the concept
of an "attribution procedure" to verify the source and content of an electronic
message. The drafters define an "attribution procedure" as: "a procedure
established by law, regulation or agreement, or adopted by the parties for the
purpose of verifying that an electronic authentication, record, message, or
performance
is that of the respective party or is for detecting changes or errors in
, , 35
content. '
An attribution procedure "may include algorithms, codes, identifying words or
numbers, encryption, callback procedures, or any other reasonable security
device."" 5 If the attribution procedure is commercially reasonable, 7 the use of an
attribution procedure can assist the recipient in proving the source of an electronic
message. Under proposed section 2B-1 16, an electronic message is "attributable"
to a person in two circumstances. 8 First, a message is "attributable" to a party if
the message was in fact the action of the party or the party's agent. 9 Obviously,

234. The latest drafts of revised Articles 2 and 2A simply copied the then-current provisions of
Article 2B. See U.C.C. §§ 2-210 to -214 (Discussion Draft 1997) (visited Jan. 28, 1998)
<http:/www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/ucc2797.htm>; U.C.C. §§ 2A-207 to -212 (Discussion
Draft 1997) (visited Jan. 28, 1998) <http:llwww.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulclucc2/ucc2a797.htm>.
Presumably, Articles 2 and 2A will conform to the electronic commerce provisions in the final draft
of Article 2B. Accordingly, this article only discusses Article 2B with respect to these issues.
235. U.C.C. § 2B-1 15(a) (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998).
236. Id. § 2B-114 reporter's note 3.
237. Id. § 2B-116(a)(2). "An attribution procedure established by law or regulation is
commercially reasonable for the purposes for which it was established." Id. § 2B-1 14(1). As to
attribution procedures agreed upon or adoptedby the parties, commercial reasonableness "is determined
in light of the purposes ofthe procedure and the commercial circumstances at the time the parties agree
to or adopt the procedure." Id. § 2B-114(2). The question of commercial reasonableness of the
attribution procedure is for the court. Id. §2B-114.
238. In addition to attribution, a person who has previously identified himself to others by use
of numbers, codes, or computer programs may incur liability for losses caused by his negligence. The
current draft of section 2B-116 provides:
(c) A person is liable for losses in the nature of reliance, if the losses occur
because:
(1) the person failed to exercise reasonable care;
(2) the relying person reasonably relied on the belief that the other

person was the source of an electronic authentication, message, record,
or performance;
(3) that reliance resulted from acts of a third person that obtained
access [to] numbers, codes, computer programs, or the like from a
source under the control ofthe person that failed to exercise reasonable
care; and
(4) the use of the access numbers, codes, computer programs, or the
like created the appearance that it came from that person.
Id. § 2B-1 16(c). The difficult issues relating to this loss-allocation scheme are beyond the scope of this
article.
239. Id. § 2B-116(a)(1).
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there is nothing remarkable about this alternative. If it can be established that a
person, or the person's agent2 40 sent a message, that person is responsible for it.
The difficulty for the recipient, ofcourse, is proving the identity of the sender when
the purported sender denies responsibility for the message.
Second, an electronic message is "attributable" to a person if "the other person,
in accordance with a commercially reasonable attribution procedure for identifying
a person, in good faith reasonably concluded that it was the action of the other
person, a person authorized by it, or the person's electronic agent. 2 4' This
attribution method creates a presumption that the message is that of the party to
whom it is attributed2 42 and focuses on situations where the parties agree to use or
adopt an attribution procedure.243 The theory underlying this attribution method is
that if the parties have agreed on a commercially reasonable method of
identification, and if one party has used that method so as to indicate that the other
party did send the message, then it is perfectly logical to create a presumption that
the other party did, in fact, send the message. This presumption is rebuttable.2 "
The attribution rules of Article 2B also deal with the problem of establishing
that the content of an electronic message has not been altered since it was
transmitted. Section 2B-1 17 provides:
If the parties use a commercially reasonable attribution procedure to
detect errors or changes in the content of an electronic record, as between
the parties, the following rules apply:

240. This section is innovative in that it approves the concept that a computer can be programmed
to initiate or respond to a message without human intervention and that the act ofthat "electronic agent"
is attributable to the principal. "Electronic agent" is defined as "a computerprogram or other electronic
or automated means used, selected, or programmed by a party to initiate or respond on behalf of that
person to electronic messages or performances in whole or in part without review by an individual."
Id. § 2B-102(a)(18). See generally John P. Fischer, Note, Computers as Agents: A Proposed
Approach to Revised U.C. Article 2, 72 IND. L.. 545, 556-70 (1997) (analyzing the computer-principal agency relationship in proposed Article 2).
241. U.C.C. § 2B-1 16(a)(2) (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998).
242. Id. § 2B-16(b).
243. Id. § 2B-116 reporter's note 3. One may assume that it also applies to an attribution
procedure established by law.
244. Id. The U.C.C. provides that "presumption" or "presumed" means that "the trier of fact
must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which would
support a finding of its non-existence." U.C.C. § 1-201(31) (1995). This is in accord with the rule in
federal court and in most states that the effect of a presumption disappears ifthe other party introduces
any evidence indicating the non-existence ofthe presumed fact. This is sometimes called the "bursting
bubble" or"Thayer" approach. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§
2490-91 (1981); KENNErH S. BROUN Er AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344, at 582-83 (John
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). If the party against whom the presumption operates denies the
existence of the presumed fact, then the presumption disappears. Id. A second, minority view is the
"Morgan" or "burden shifting" approach which says that a presumption continues until the party
against whom the presumption operates proves that it is more likely than not that the presumed fact did
not occur. In other words, this latter view has the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion on the
issue of the presumed fact to the person against whom the presumption operates. Id. at 586.
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(1)An electronic authentication, message, record, or performance that
the attribution procedure shows to have been unaltered since a point in
time is presumed to have been unaltered since that time.
(2) An electronic authentication, message, record, or performance
created or sent pursuant to the attribution procedure is presumed to have
the content intended by the person creating or sending it as to portions to
which the procedure applies.
(3) Ifthe sender complied with the attribution procedure, but the other
party did not, and the change or error would have been detected had the
other party also complied, the sender is not bound by the error or change.245
In effect, this section presumes that electronic records have not been altered or do
not contain mistakes if the parties have used a commercially reasonable attribution
procedure capable of detecting the same.246

b.

The Uniform Electronic TransactionsAct

With respect to electronic records and electronic signatures, the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) defines a "security procedure" as:
a procedure or methodology, established by law or regulation, or
established by agreement, or adopted by the parties, for the purpose of
verifying that an electronic signature, record, or performance is that of a
specific person or for detecting changes or errors in the informational
content of an electronic record. The term includes a procedure that
requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or
numbers, encryption, callback or other acknowledgment procedures, or any
other procedures that are reasonable under the circumstances. 24'
The UETA uses the concept of a security procedure to assist in establishing the
identity of the sender of an electronic message in essentially the same way as Article
2B uses the concept ofan attribution procedure. Section 202 of the UETA provides:
(a) An electronic record is attributable to a person if... (2) the other
person, in good faith and acting in compliance with a comercially

245. U.C.C. § 2B-117 (Proposed Draft Apr. 15, 1998).
246. Proposed Article 2B also provides for allocation of losses resulting from undetected errors
including a novel provision that excuses consumers from being bound by errors in electronic messages
not caused by the consumer's fault, so long as the consumer promptly notifies the other party of the
error and does not retain any benefits of the transaction as a result. Id. § 213-118.
247. UETA, supra note 184, § 102(18).
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reasonable security procedure for identifying the person to which the
electronic record is sought to be attributed, reasonably concluded that it
was the action of the other person, a person authorized by it, or the
person's electronic agent....
(b) Attribution of an electronic record to a person under subsection
(a)(2) has the effect provided for by the agreement regarding the security
procedure and, in the absence of terms about such effect, creates a
presumption that the electronic record was that of the person to which it is
attributed.2 4
Thus the UETA creates a presumption ofidentity ofthe sender in basically the same
circumstances as U.C.C. Article 2B.
In proving the integrity of the content of an electronic message, the UETA
almost precisely tracks the approach of Article 2B. It provides:
If the parties act in compliance with a commercially reasonable
security procedure to detect errors or changes in the informational content
of an electronic record, between the parties the following rules apply:
(a) An electronic record that the security procedure shows to have
been unaltered since a specified point in time is presumed to have been
unaltered since that time.
(b) An electronic record created or sent in accordance with the
security procedure is presumed to have the informational content intended
by the person creating or sending it as to portions of the informational
content to which the security procedure applies.249
However, unlike Article 2B, the UETA provides for specific consequences of
this presumption." It states that .[p]resumption' or 'presumed' means that the trier
of fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is
introduced which would support a finding of its non-existence."'" Thus the UETA
adopts the "bursting bubble" approach to presumptions. Once the person against
whom the presumption operates introduces any evidence that would support a
finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, the mandatory effect of the
presumption disappears. 2 Hence, with respect to the issue of the identity of the
sender of the electronic message, if the person indicated by the security procedure

248. Id. § 202(a)(2), (b).
249. Id. § 203(a), (b).
250. See supra note 244.
251. UETA, supranote 184, § 102(15) [Alternative 1] (Discussion Draft Mar. 23, 1998). The
present draft contains three alternative formulations of the definition, but each of them has the same
substantive meaning. Id. reporter's note.
252. See id. reporter's note. The Reporter suggests that the drafting committee continue to
consider whether the effect of the presumption should be specified. Id.
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as the source of the message denies sending it, the mandatory effect of the
presumption ceases and the issue of who sent the message becomes a question for
the trier of fact. Similarly, if the sender of the message testifies that the content of
the message is not the same as the one he sent, the mandatory effect of the
presumption of message integrity also terminates, and a factual issue for the trier
arises.
c. State Law Developments
Three substantially different approaches have emerged in state legislation
concerning the issues of identifying the sender of an electronic message and
establishing the integrity of the content of an electronic message. These approaches
are the Utah approach, the Florida and Georgia approach, and the Illinois approach.
(1) The Utah Approach: Evidentiary Presumptions Based on
DigitalSignatures
As noted earlier, the Utah Digital Signature Act addresses only electronic
records that are signed with a digital signature.253 In addition, the statute provides
that if the digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid certificate
issued by a licensed CA, the court shall presume that the digital signature is that of
the person listed in the certificate, that it was affixed by that person with the
intention of signing the message, and that the recipient had no notice that the signer
breached any duty owed to the CA or does not rightfully hold the private key used
to create the signature.Y4 Although the Utah Act does not provide for a presumption
that the content of a digitally signed electronic record has not been altered, it does
say that the other presumption only arises if a digital signature has been verified."
In order for a digital signature to be verified, it must be determined that the
"message has not been altered since its digital signature was created."256
'
(2) The Florida and Georgia Approach: No Provision for
EvidentiaryIssues
Unlike the narrowly focused approach of the Utah statute, Georgia's Electronic
Records and Signatures Act 7 takes a hands-off approach to issues concerning the
identity ofthe sender ofan electronic message as well as the integrity ofthe content
of the electronic message.258 The act does not attempt to distinguish between any

253. See supratext accompanying notes 208-09.
254. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-406(3) (Supp. 1997).
255. Id.
256. Id. § 103(40)(b).
257. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-1 to -5 (Supp. 1997).
258. Id.
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of the different forms of electronic records or electronic signatures. Furthermore,
it contains no provision for any evidentiary consequences flowing from the use of
any electronic signature.
Florida's Electronic Signatures Act also takes a hands-off approach to these
evidentiary issues." 9 Although the Florida statute does not distinguish between
various forms of electronic records or electronic signatures, the statute gives the
Secretary of State the power to issue "certificates for the purpose of verifying digital
signatures," 2" but also provides that a public or private entity need not participate
in the Secretary of State's certification program to verify a digital signature.26'
Thus, in both Georgia and Florida, the recipient of an electronic message faces
formidable barriers to proving who was the source of the message and that the
content of the message has not been altered since transmission.
(3) The IllinoisApproach: An IntermediatePosition
With respect to identifying the source of an electronic message, the proposed
'
Illinois Act creates a category of signatures called a "secure electronic signature."262
A secure electronic signature arises if it can be verified, by use of a "qualified
' that "an electronic signature is the signature of a specific
security procedure,"263
2
,
4
person. '
There are two forms of a qualified security procedure for identifying a party
that can make an electronic signature a secure electronic signature. First, if the
parties have previously agreed to use the security procedure, then a signature
verified by such a procedure is a secure electronic signature.265 Second, if a
signature is verified by a security procedure approved by the Illinois.Secretary of
State, then it is a secure electronic signature.2' In order for a security procedure to
qualify under this method, the Secretary of State must find that the security
procedure is "generally accepted in the applicable information security industry or
scientific community as being capable" 267 of creating an electronic signature that

259. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.70-75 (West Supp. 1998).
260. Id. § 282.74.
261. Id.
262. Electronic Commerce Security Act, § 10-110, H.ILR. 3180,90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-1998
Reg. Sess. (III., introduced Feb. 11, 1998), available at (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http://www.mbc.com/iecsa.html>.
263. Id. § 10-110(a). A security procedure with respect to confirming the identity of the sender
of an electronic message is "a methodology or procedure used for the purpose of... verifying that an
electronic record is that of a specific person." Id. § 5-105. The qualified security procedure must be
commercially reasonable under the circumstances, applied in a trustworthy manner, and relied upon
reasonably and in good faith. Id. § 10-110(a)(1)-(3).
264.Id.§ 10-110(a).
265. Id. § 10-1 10(b)(1).
266.Id. § 10-110(b)(2).
267. Id. § 10-135(a)(2). In making this determination, the Secretary may be guided by findings
of standards organizations, such as the American National Standards Institute, the International
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is unique to the signer within the context in which it is used, can be used to
objectively identify the person signing the electronic record, was reliably
created by such identified person, (e.g., because some aspect of the procedure
involves the use of a signature device or other means or method that is under
the sole control of such person), and that cannot be readily duplicated or
compromised, and is created, and linked to the electronic record to which it
relates, in a manner such that if the record or the signature is intentionally or
unintentionally changed after signing the electronic signature is invalidated. 3
In addition, the Secretary may certify a qualified security procedure only if
(1) the technology utilized by such security procedure is completely open
and fully disclosed to the public, and has been so for a sufficient length of
time, so as to facilitate a comprehensive review and evaluation of its
suitability for the intended purpose by the applicable information security
industry or scientific community; and
(2) the technology utilized by such security procedure has been generally

accepted in the applicable information security industry or scientific
community as being capable of satisfying the requirements of [a secure
electronic signature] in a trustworthy manner. 69
If an electronic signature qualifies as a secure electronic signature, in a civil
dispute it "shall be rebuttably presumed that the secure electronic signature is the
signature of the person to whom it correlates"'27 so long as the recipient establishes
that the qualified security procedure was commercially reasonable, applied in a
trustworthy manner, and relied upon reasonably and in good faith. 7
To address the issue of confirming the integrity ofthe content of an electronic
record, the proposed Illinois Act creates a category of records called secure
electronic records.272 A secure electronic record arises when a qualified security
procedure that is commercially reasonable under the circumstances, applied in a
trustworthy manner, and relied upon in good faith verifies that an electronic record
has not been altered since a specified point in time. 73 The proposed Illinois Act
provides that a security procedure is a qualified security procedure to detect changes
in the content of an electronic record if it meets either of two criteria: (1) if it is
previously agreed upon by the parties; 27 or, (2) if it has been certified by the
Standards Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Id. § 10-135(b).
268.Id. § 10-110(b)(2)(A)-(D).
269. Id. § 10-135(a)(1), (2).
270. Id. § 10-120(b).

271. Id. § 10-1 10(a)(l)-(3).
272. Id. § 10-105.
273. Id. § 10-105(a).

274. Id. § 10-105(b)(1).
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Secretary of State as being capable of providing reliable evidence that the content
of an electronic record has not been altered.275 The Act also provides that a digital
signature certified by the Secretary of State may constitute a qualified security
procedure if it meets certain other requirements. 6 If a record is a secure electronic
record, then in a civil dispute it "shall be rebuttably presumed that the electronic
record has not been altered since the specific point in time to which the secure status
relates. 277
d. Analysis ofthe VariousApproaches to Verifying the Source and
Content of an ElectronicMessage
As the foregoing discussion indicates, anumber ofunresolved issues among the
various uniform and state law initiatives concern whether, and to what extent, to
provide statutory answers to the problems of verifying the source and content of
electronic messages. The next portion of this Article reviews three of these issues.
(1) Is itAppropriateto TreatElectronicSignaturesandRecords
Verified by Security ProceduresDifferentlyfrom Others?
As noted, the Georgia and Florida approach does not differentiate between
forms of electronic records or signatures with respect to their reliability.278 One can
make a number of arguments in favor of this hands-off approach, but they are not
persuasive and are outweighed by other considerations.
One argument is that, because the Statute of Frauds does not differentiate
between different types of writings based on their reliability, neither should
legislation equating electronic records with signed writings. This argument is
premised on the notion that electronic commerce legislation should simply equate
electronic writings with paper writings. However, this argument overlooks the fact

275. Id. § 10-105(b)(2). In order to be so certified, the security procedure must be fully disclosed
to the public and generally accepted in the applicable scientific or information security community.
Id. § I0-135(a)(1), (2).
276. Id. § 15-101.

277. Id. § 10-120(a). With respect to both the presumption about secure electronic records and
the presumption about secure electronic signatures, the proposed Illinois Act provides that the party
against whom the presumption operates has the "burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence." Id. § 10-120(b). Thus, the
proposed Illinois Act adopts the "Morgan" or "burden-shifting" approach to presumptions. See supra
note 244. This means that the purported sender of the message must do more than simply deny he sent

the disputed message inorder to avoid the mandatory effect of the presumption. Electronic Commerce
Security Act, § 10-120, cmt. 3, H.R. 3180, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (ILl., introduced
Feb. 11, 1998), availableat (visited Apr. 28, 1998) <http://www.mbc.com/ieesa.html>.
278. Actually, the Georgia statute only relates to electronic signatures, which do have certain
attributes of reliability. See supratext accompanying note 213. However, the Georgia statute does not
provide for any evidentiary consequences of using electronic signatures, but merely provides that such
a signature is a sufficient signing for state law purposes. Id.
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that the Statute of Frauds' traditional requirement of an ink-on-paper promise
provides very reliable evidence of the existence and scope of the promise sought to
be enforced. By doing away with this traditional requirement, thereby allowing the
Statute ofFrauds to be satisfied by electronic messages with no indicia of reliability,
states adopting the hands-off approach substantially undermine the evidentiary
function of the Statute of Frauds.
On the other hand, statutes encouraging parties to use security procedures
substantially enhance the evidentiary value of an electronic message in two ways.
First, use of a security procedure assists in verifying the identity of the sender of an
electronic message. In paper-based transactions, the identity of the sender of a

message is indicated by the signature and its physical characteristics. Merely
appending the digital equivalent of one's name at the end of an electronic message
cannot serve to identify the sender because the name is merely a string of binary
data that could be appended by anyone. However, security procedures of the type
described in the uniform acts and the proposed Illinois Act serve as additional,
reliable evidence of the identity of the sender of an electronic message.
Second, using a security procedure assists in verifying the content of an
electronic message. In paper-based transactions, the integrity of the contents of the
paper is usually established by the absence of visible marks of alteration or other
evidence (e.g., that additions to the paper have been made by a different type of
ink). Unfortunately, the digital content of an electronic message can be altered in
ways that are impossible to detect. However, security procedures of the type
described in the uniform acts and the proposed Illinois Act serve as very reliable
evidence that the content of the message has not been altered since it was signed.
In addition, the argument that revisions to the Statute of Frauds should not
differentiate between different types of electronic messages overlooks the fact that
the Statute of Frauds as presently interpreted only modestly serves the earmarking
and cautionary functions described by Professor Perillo.279 The use of a security
procedure, encouraged by the uniform acts and the proposed Illinois Act, would
enhance these functions of the Statute of Frauds.
The use of a security procedure serves the earmarking function by assisting in
the determination ofwhen the parties have gone beyond mere negotiations and have
entered into a legally enforceable promise. One would expect that parties to an
electronic commerce transaction would not invoke the security procedure at a time
when a potential buyer is merely browsing items at the seller's web site. Instead, the
parties would invoke the security procedure only at the time the party were prepared
to consummate the transaction. Hence, if the parties have used a security procedure
to verify an electronic message, that should constitute persuasive evidence that the
parties thought the message sufficiently important to go beyond mere negotiation.28 °
279. Perillo, supranote 146, at 48-56.
280. Of course, because of other requirements for contract enforceability, such as consideration,
the use of a security procedure to authenticate an electronic message would not fully serve the
earmarking function. See id. at 50.
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Likewise, the use of a security procedure serves the cautionary function of
warning the parties that they are entering into a legally enforceable transaction just
as the act of signing one's name to a piece of paper serves the same purpose. The
act of invoking a security procedure emphasizes the fact that one is entering into a
transaction with potential legal consequences. Hence, treating electronic messages
verified by a security procedure differently than unverified messages encourages the
use of a security procedure and serves some functions not currently served by the
Statute of Frauds.
Another argument in favor ofthe hands offapproach of the Florida and Georgia
statutes is that the market for security procedures in electronic commerce is in its
infancy and any attempt to regulate the type of security procedures that receive
special treatment in electronic commerce is premature. According to this argument,
the free market will inevitably find the most efficient way to internalize the costs
associated with the risk of electronic commerce and any interference with that
market skews the result. This argument has substantial effect when directed at
statutes like the one enacted in Utah, which singles out only digital signatures for
special treatment. However, the argument loses much of its force when applied to
statutes that allow the parties to agree to the use of security procedures and to treat
such agreed-upon procedures differently because the agreement reflects the action
of market forces.
Finally, encouraging the use of security procedures minimizes the number of
electronic commerce disputes that result in litigation. If a message has been sent by
an impostor or been tampered with in transit, or if a message has simply been
corrupted in the course of transmission, reliable security procedures should indicate
to the recipient that something is amiss. If the message cannot be verified by the
security procedure, then the recipient will probably attempt to contact the purported
sender and inquire about the message before relying on it. This should limit the
number of controversies arising from electronic commerce transactions.
(2) What Security ProceduresAre Sufficiently Reliable to Merit
Special Treatment?
Assuming that it is proper for a state to encourage the use of security
procedures in electronic commerce, what forms of security procedures should
qualify for special legislative treatment? Once again, there has been disagreement
among the uniform and state laws addressing this issue. The Utah statute is limited
to digital signatures, the uniform law focuses on security procedures agreed to by
the parties, and the Illinois approach includes security procedures previously agreed
on by the parties and other administratively certified security procedures.
(a) DigitalSignaturesAlone
Undoubtedly, digital signatures provide the most reliable method ofidentifying
the source and verifying the content of an electronic message. Digital signature
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technology has been subjected to intense scrutiny in the information security
industry for more than a decade and found to be essentially fool-proof, so long as
it is based on appropriate algorithms, the subscriber safeguards his private key, and
the certification authority acts to reliably identify the subscriber. The Utah
legislature was certainly justified in concluding that most messages verified by a
digital signature are sufficiently reliable to be entitled to enhanced evidentiary
status. However, by according this status only to digital signatures, the Utah
approach suffers from some serious problems.
First, the Utah statute discourages the development and adoption of other forms
of security procedures.2"' The Utah statute leaves other forms ofelectronic messages
in a legal limbo, because it is unclear whether any such electronic message could
even satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.282 Even if some other form of
electronic message might satisfy the Statute of Frauds, by specifying digital
signatures as the sole form of security procedure giving rise to evidentiary
presumptions as to the source and content of the electronic message, the Utah statute
gives digital signatures a substantial competitive advantage over other security
procedures. Potential purchasers of security systems may conclude that other
security procedures are necessarily unreliable merely because they are omitted from
the statute. Furthermore, even if a new security procedure develops that provides
identical, or even superior, reliability, such technology will face substantial barriers

to market entry. These barriers can only be overcome by the enactment of legislation
giving the new technology a status similar to digital signatures.
Second, the Utah statute is premised on the assumption that the digital signature
is the only presently available and commercially reasonable form of electronic
communication. It may be true that the digital signature is the only presently
available method of reliably verifying the source and content of an electronic
message in cases involving stranger-to-stranger transactions. However, a substantial
amount of electronic commerce is carried on by parties who have repeated dealings
with each other. In such cases, the parties should be free to adopt their own form of
security procedure. If the procedure is commercially reasonable, then their
agreement should be encouraged by giving enhanced evidentiary effect to the
message verified by the parties' chosen security procedure.
Third, the Utah statute treats all digital signatures alike, regardless of the level
of security afforded by the algorithms underlying them. Presently, there are two
widely accepted public algorithms used in digital signatures, the RSA (RivestShamir-Adelman) algorithm and the DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) algorithm.2 '
However, earlier, shorter forms of the RSA algorithm have been successfully
factored by a concerted effort of scientists and students utilizing idle processor time
on a great number of computer workstations. 2 Likewise, a new form of
281. See Winn, supranote 18.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 208-09.
283. FORD & BAUM, supranote 1, at 109-15.
284. Id.at 110. The algorithm that was successfully factored was a 129-digit (429-bit) modulus
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cryptosystem, called an elliptical curve cryptosystem, is a variant of other
cryptosystems that depend upon a discrete logarithm problem.28 s The elliptical curve
has been studied for several years and appears promising as a basis for digital
signatures, but it does not yet have the same level of acceptance in the information
security community as the RSA and DSA algorithms. The Utah statute treats all
digital signatures alike, regardless of the strength or level of acceptance of the
underlying algorithms.286
Finally, the Utah statute implements extensive regulation of certification
authorities (CAs). The Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code
(Division) ofthe Utah Department of Commerce is given the power both to act as a
CA itself and to license other CAs.287 CAs must meet detailed licensure requirements
designed to provide evidence of reliability, trustworthiness, and financial stability
and are subject to annual performance audits.288 Finally, the CA must provide a
"suitable guaranty" in the form of a surety bond or a letter of credit in a form and
amount specified by the Division." 9 Although CAs play a critical role for digital
signatures, this extensive regulation increases the cost of digital signature technology
and discourages its use, thus retarding the development of a robust electronic
commerce market based on reliable forms of electronic communication.
(b) Security ProcedureAgreed to by the Parties
The uniform acts' focus on security (or attribution) procedures agreed to by the
parties serves to further the notion of freedom of contract and avoids the problem of
the Utah statute's attempt to specify a particular technology as the sole, secure form
of engaging in electronic commerce. If the parties are free to adopt an attribution
procedure, they will adopt one that is appropriate to the risk posed by their
that had been posted as a public challenge by the inventors of the RSA algorithm in 1977. The RSA
algorithm is considered safe, nonetheless, because a relatively small increase in the size of the RSA
modulus results in a large increase in the effort required to factor it. Id.
285.Id. at 116-17.
286. The Utah statute indirectly places limits on the types of digital signatures that fall within its
scope. The term "digital signature" is defined as
a transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem such that a
person having the initial message and the signer's public key can accurately
determine whether: (a) the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signer's public key; and (b) the message has been altered since
the transformation was made.
UTAH CODEANN. § 46-3-103(10) (Supp. 1997). The statute defines "asymmetric cryptosystem" as "an
algorithm or series of algorithms which provide a secure key pair." Id. § 103(2). Although the term
"secure" is not defined, a digital signature based on an algorithm known to be insecure may not qualify
as a "digital signature" because it cannot generate a secure key pair. It is unclear whether the drafters
ofthe Utah statute intended the proponent ofa digitally-signed document to have the burden of proving
that the digital signature was created using an asymmetric cryptosystem as defined in the statute.

287. Id. § 104(1).
288. Id. §§ 201, 202.
289. Id. § 201(1)(d).
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contemplated transactions. Hence, it may be something as complex as a digital
signature or something as simple as a PIN number.
Two difficulties arise with an approach based on the use of attribution
procedures agreed to by the parties. The first is the difficulty posed by an
economically-dominant party insisting on the use of an inappropriate security
procedure. This difficulty is dissipated by the uniform acts' requirements that the
security procedure be commercially reasonable and that the recipient of an electronic
message exercise good faith and reasonably rely on the security procedure.29 These
limitations should prevent most forms of overreaching.
The second difficulty, however, is one for which there appears to be no remedy.
In order for the uniform acts' provisions to apply, the security procedure must be
agreed to (or adopted) by the parties. It is unclear how one proves the initial
agreement to use the attribution procedure. If there were a requirement that the
attribution procedure be previously agreed upon by the parties, then independent
evidence of the identity of the party arising from the agreement to use the attribution
procedure would exist. This would justify presuming that subsequent messages
verified by the attribution procedure did, in fact, come from that party. However, the
commentary to section 2B-1 14 indicates that an attribution procedure need not be
previously agreed upon by the parties. This commentary provides:

On the other hand, agreement or adoption need not precede the transaction
involved. Parties dealing for the first time may adopt a procedure for
authentication of messages. That adopted procedure would have the full
force of an attribution procedure it if is commercially reasonable.29
This commentary is puzzling. On the one hand, it suggests that no prior
agreement to use the security procedure is necessary. However, if the parties send a
series of electronic messages as part of a single transaction, it would be extremely
difficult for the recipient of the message to prove the identity of the person who, in
one of the earlier messages, agreed to use an attribution procedure. Certainly, the
drafters could not have intended to allow the recipient of the message to use an
attribution procedure to prove the identity of the other party for the purpose of
showing who initially agreed to the use of the attribution procedure. Such a result
would be perfectly circular.
Alternatively, this commentary might imply that the recipient of a series of
messages might take other measures to identify the source of an electronic message
after an exchange of messages and that such other measures might be sufficient to
establish the identity of the person agreeing to the attribution procedure. For
example, the recipient might ask for a street address, telephone number, or other
identifying information that could subsequently be confirmed by reference to an

290. U.C.C. § 2B-1 16(a)(2) (Proposed Draft Apr. 15,1998); UETA, supranote 184, § 202(a)(2).
291. U.C.C. § 2B-1 14 reporter's note 2 (Discussion Draft Apr. 15, 1998).
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independent third party. However, in such a case the recipient would have
independent evidence of the identity ofthe person and this would undercut the need
for the presumption flowing from the use of the attribution procedure in the first
place.
In short, the effect of the attribution procedure in light of this commentary is
unclear. The thrust of Aiticle 2B and the UETA is that the parties should be free to
agree on an attribution procedure and, so long as it is commercially reasonable, the
use of that procedure to indicate the identity of the sender should have the effect of
giving rise to a presumption as to the identity of the sender. This result and the
reasoning behind it make perfect sense in cases where the parties agree to use an
attribution procedure in contemplation of a series of future transactions. However,
in stranger-to-stranger transactions, it is difficult to see how one could prove the
existence of an attribution procedure by agreement. 2 If that is the case, then the
presumption flowing from use of an attribution procedure may be limited to cases
where parties to an electronic message have a prior course of dealing and will have
little or no utility in stranger-to-stranger transactions.293
(c) Security ProceduresPreviouslyAgreed to by the Parties
and OtherReliable Security Procedures
The proposed Illinois Act recognizes two ways in which a security procedure can
be a qualified security procedure for purposes of identifying the source of an
electronic message. First, it includes a security procedure "previously agreed to by
' This provision is similar to the approach of the uniform acts, but it
the parties."294
limits the security procedures to those that are previously agreed to. The basis for this
limitation is the inherent difficulty of proving an agreement of the parties to use a
security procedure when that agreement is part of a single series of electronic
messages.2 9 By requiring a previous agreement, the proposed Illinois Act requires
that there be some way of proving the identity of the person originally agreeing to the
use of a security procedure before subsequent messages verified by the security
procedure would be attributable to that person. Once the original agreement is
established, subsequent communications between the parties using this security
procedure allow the recipient to verify the sender's identity by use of the security
procedure. The recipient is entitled to a presumption that the sender did send the

292. It would, of course, be possible to show that the parties had used an attribution procedure
otherwise established by law, but that is not what the commentary to section 2B-114 states. Id.
293. Of course, the drafters of Article 2B may have believed that stranger-to-stranger transactions
would rarely involve an amount of money ($20,000) that would trigger Proposed Article 2B's Statute
of Frauds provision. Id. § 2B-201(a)(2)(B).
294. Electronic Commerce Security Act §§ 10-105(b)(1), 10-110(b)(1), H.R. 3180, 90th Gen.
Assembly, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (ILl., introduced Feb. 11, 1998), availableat (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http://www.mbe.com/ieesa.html>.
295. This difficulty was previously discussed in connection with the provisions of proposed
Article 2B. See supratext accompanying notes 292-93.
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message, so long as the security procedure was commercially reasonable, used in a
trustworthy manner, and was relied upon reasonably and in good faith.29 By so
limiting this class of qualified security procedures, the Illinois Act sends a clear
message that this.form of qualified security procedure will not arise in cases of
stranger-to-stranger transactions.
In order to encourage the development and implementation of security
procedures that could be utilized in stranger-to-stranger transactions, the proposed
Illinois Act creates a second class of "qualified security procedure"-any security
procedure certified by the Illinois Secretary of State according to standards set forth
in the Act.2" Initially, the proposed Illinois Act also included digital signatures as a
third class of "qualified security procedure."293 However, the drafters deleted digital
signatures due to the difficulty of differentiating which forms of digital signature are
based on sufficiently reliable algorithms and which are not. In other words, the
drafters realized that not all digital signatures are alike and that thejob of sorting out
the reliable from the unreliable ones requires a level of expertise best left to
administrative evaluation. Furthermore, the drafters were persuaded that specifying
a particular form of digital signature in the statute-for example, only those based
on a 1024-bit RSA algorithm-might deter the development of other security
procedures, grant an undue competitive advantage to particular implementations of
digital signatures, and be rendered inaccurate by subsequent developments.
Nevertheless, the statute contemplates that at least some forms of digital signatures
are likely candidates for certification by the Secretary. 2
Instead of attempting to determine precisely what types of security procedures

might qualify, the proposed Illinois Act establishes neutral standards for determining
what forms of security procedures should be certified as a qualified security
procedures. By establishing standards, the proposed Illinois Act is technologically
neutral, yet gives sufficient guidance to interested parties regarding the
characteristics that will be required of a security procedure before it can be certified.
Furthermore, this procedure allows for an on-going review of new security
procedures which may be developed and does not require amendment of the statute
to recognize these technologies. This approach presents two principal issues: what
standards should guide the decision about security procedures?; and, which decisionmaking body should have the power to approve these security procedures?
The proposed Illinois Act contains a number of requirements for the first of these

296. Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-110(a)(1)-(3), H.R. 3180, 90th Gen. Assembly,
1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Ill., introduced Feb. 11, 1998), availableat (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http://www.mbc.com/iecsa.html>.
297. Id. §§ 10-105(b)(2), 10-110(b)(2).
298. Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 302(b)(1) (Discussion Draft Nov. 15, 1997).
299. Electronic Commerce Security Act, § 15-105, H.R. 3180, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-1998
Reg. Sess. (Ill., introduced Feb. 11, 1998), availableat (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http://www.mbc.com/iecsa.html>. This section provides that, if the Secretary certifies a digital
signature as a qualified security procedure, additional facts should be established before the digitally
signed message is entitled to the statutory presumptions of genuineness.
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issues. The goal of these standards is to describe the attributes of a security procedure
that would provide a reliable method of identifying the source of an electronic
message in a stranger-to-stranger transaction. Hence, the proposed Illinois Act
requires that, before the Secretary certifies a new security procedure,
the technology utilized by such security procedure is completely open and
fully disclosed to the public and has been so for a sufficient length of time
so as to facilitate a comprehensive review and evaluation of its suitability for
the intended purpose by the applicable information security industry or
scientific community. 3"
This requirement not only enhances the evaluation of the security procedure, but also
serves to more widely disseminate information about security procedures.
Furthermore, the Act requires that the technology be "generally accepted in the
applicable information security industry or scientific community" as meeting the
standards of the act." ' This requirement has the salutary effect of requiring the
Secretary to consider whether the experts in the area have arrived at a consensus and
also prevents the hasty certification of a security procedure that might be touted as
reliable by its proponents, but not yet accepted by disinterested third-party experts.
With respect to secure electronic records, the security procedure must be
"capable of providing reliable evidence that an electronic record has not been
altered."30 z Regarding secure electronic signatures, a security procedure must be
capable of creating an electronic signature that is unique to the signer, can be used
to objectively identify the sender, was reliably created by the sender, and is reliably
linked to the electronic record.0 3 These are rigorous standards indeed, but they are
necessary because a certified security procedure will have the enhanced evidentiary
effect of presumptions of genuineness even if there is no prior agreement by the
parties for its use. As such, the security procedure must be one that can be reliably
used by parties in a stranger-to-stranger transaction.
The second issue of who should determine whether a security procedure
qualifies under the relevant standards is also a difficult one. Ideally, a national or
international accrediting body comprised of scientists or information security experts
might come into existence and develop standards for security procedures in
electronic commerce. However, that development is years, if not decades, in the
future. Hence, if provision is to be made for security procedures in stranger-tostranger transactions, each state should attempt to resolve the issue.
One alternative would be to leave the issue to the judiciary. A legislature could
promulgate standards, and leave to the courts the determination, on a case-by-case
basis of whether a security procedure meets those standards. However, this approach
300. Id. § 10-135(a)(1).
301. Id. § 10-135(a)(2).
302. Id. § 10-105(b)(2).
303. Id. § 10-1 10(b)(2)(A)-(D).
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has significant shortcomings. First, it would likely deter the development of
alternative security procedures. In order to receive the sanction of ajudicial decision,
someone would have to utilize the new security procedure in a transaction with
enough money at stake to justify litigation through the appellate level. It is unlikely
that a private party would have the incentive to do this." ° Second, the judiciary has
very limited fact-finding capability and would be limited to the evidence presented
by the parties. In this situation, it is more desirable that the decision-making body
have independent fact-gathering means, in order to take advantage of the expertise
available in the information security industry.
A second alternative is to require the proponents of each new technology to
persuade the legislature to amend the statute to include the new technology as a
secure electronic record or signature. This would require the proponents of the
security procedure to gain the ear of the legislature in each state, a matter that has
been difficult enough with respect to other, more basic electronic commerce issues.
The final alternative is some form of administrative action. This would allow the
administrative agency to employ experts necessary to evaluate the procedure, take
advantage of the knowledge in the information security industry,"' and for
competing views to be aired in the normal rule-making process. Furthermore, the rate
of change in the area of information security is fast paced. As older, once-reliable
security procedures are proven to have flaws, new or improved security procedures
will emerge to take their place. Allowing administrative determination of what
security procedures should be qualified provides an ongoing review of new
technologies without the need for statutory amendment. Additionally, provision
should be made for decertifying a security procedure if subsequent developments
3°6
show that it is no longer capable of performing the functions listed in the statute.
All of these considerations suggest that an administrative body is likely the best
entity to determine the difficult questions of what security procedures should to
qualify for special treatment.
(3) Is an Evidentiary Presumption a Proper Way to
Encourage the Use of SecurityProcedures?
Assuming that it is proper for a legislature to encourage the use of more secure
forms of electronic communication, is it appropriate to encourage that use by
affording to records and signatures, verified by a security procedure a rebuttable

304. Of course, the developer of the security procedure would have a powerful incentive to
instigate a collusive lawsuit between two of its cronies, who might create a dispute solely for the
purpose of putting forward evidence favorable to the security procedure.
305. The proposed Illinois Act specifically provides that the Secretary may be guided by finding
of a number of recognized national and international standards-setting bodies. Electronic Commerce
Security Act § 10-135(b), H.R. 3180,90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Ill., introduced Feb.
11, 1998), availableat (visited Apr. 28, 1998) <http://www.mbc.com/iecsa.html>.
306.Id. § 10-135(d).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss4/6

58

Electronic Commerce on the Internet and the Statute of Frauds
1998]Robertson:
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

presumption that the record has not been altered and that the signature is that of the
person indicated by the security procedure? Virtually all of the traditional
justifications underlying evidentiary presumptions are present with respect to using
a security procedure to verify the source and content of an electronic record.
First, because of the requirements that the security procedure be commercially
reasonable and reasonably relied upon in good faith, proof of the predicate fact (use
of a security procedure to verify the source and content of an electronic message) is
a highly reliable indicator of the existence of the presumed facts (the person
indicated by the security procedure did send the message and that it has not been
altered). The most important consideration in the creation of a presumption is its
probability." 7
Second, absent the presumption, it will be very difficult for the recipient of an
electronic message to prove the source and content of the electronic message. Unless
the parties have a history of prior transactions, the recipient will not likely have any
evidence of the source and content of the message other than the results of the
security procedure and the reliability of that procedure. Presumptions are frequently
justified by the difficulties inherent in proving that the more probable event
occurred." 8
Third, the evidence which would indicate that someone other than the purported
sender sent the message is almost exclusively in possession of the purported sender.
For example, the usual reason why a security procedure would misidentify the actual
sender of an electronic message is that someone has stolen or compromised the
defendant's access code, private key, or other method of identifying himself to the
recipient. Because the evidence about these matters is much more accessible to the
purported sender of the electronic message rather than the recipient,the presumption
is justified to correct the imbalance resulting from the purported sender's superior
access to proof of the issues."
Finally, because the recipient's use of the security procedure to verify the source
and content of the electronic message occurs before the recipient acts in reliance on
the message, the recipient's caution should be rewarded. This will prevent many
disputed electronic commerce transactions from reaching the courtroom. When the
recipient cannot verify the source or content of an electronic message by using the
security procedure, he will likely seek some form of clarification about this before
the recipient acts on the message (by shipping the product, extending credit, etc.).
Hence, the presumption is justified as rewarding this type of prereliance verification
by easing the recipient's burden of proof in the event of a dispute regarding the
identity of the sender. Presumptions are frequently created to encourage certain

307. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supranote 244, § 343, at 580. (stating that "[m]ost
presumptions have come into existence primarily because the judges have believed that proof of fact
B renders the infdrence of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to
assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it").
308. Id.
309. Id.
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social or economic policies.31 The policy of adopting appropriate security
procedures to verify the source and content of an electronic message before acting
on it would certainly seem to be a policy worthy of encouragement.
VI. CONCLUSION

Electronic commerce on the Internet has such enormous potential that it will
continue to develop, regardless of how legislatures treat the issues raised by the
Statute ofFrauds. However, electronic commerce on the Internet can best be fostered
by carefully drafted statutes which remove barriers to electronic commerce and also
encourage the use of security procedures that provide protection from the
possibilities of fraud inherent in electronic commerce and the open, free networks
over which such commerce takes place. These improvements can be achieved
without stifling future technological development and without inhibiting the parties'
freedom of contract. A middle-ground statute, like the proposed Illinois Act, will go
far to enhance the development of electronic commerce on the Internet as an
efficient, yet safe, method of doing business.

310. Id.
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